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Monagas  and  Paez:   Being 
a  Brief  View  of  the  Late 
Events  in  Venezuela 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 
THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


r 
f 

MONAGAS  AND  PAEZ 


BEINCi 


A  BRIEF  VIEW  OF    THE   LATE   EVENTS 


VENEZUELA. 

\ 


NEW  YORK : 
PRINTED  BY  S.  W.  BENEDICT,  16  SPRUCE  STREET. 

1850. 


MONAGAS  AND  PAEZ : 


BEING 


A  BRIEF  VIEW  OF   THE  LATE  EVENTS 


IN 


VENEZUELA. 


NEW    YORK: 

S.  W.  BENEDICT,  16  SPRUCE  STREET. 

1850. 


f 


F 


MONAGAS  AND  PAEZ. 


FOR  the  last  three  years  the  press  of  the  United  States  has 
been  teeming  with  articles,  emanating  from  a  party  in  Vene- 
zuela which  had  been  long  accustomed  to  monopolize  to  itself 
all  the  first  offices  of  a  country,  that  it  had  ruled  over  solely 
with  a  view  to  its  own  selfish  interests  :  this  party,  we  say,  on 
finding  the  reins  of  government  falling  from,  its  grasp,  made  the 
most  strenuous  efforts  to  recover  its  lost  power,  and  both  in 
Venezuela  and  in  the  United  States  have  used  every  means  to 
vilify  those  who  had  overthrown  them.  The  facts  are  simply 
these.  From  the  period  that  Venezuela  separated  from  Colom- 
bia, Paez  has  been  the  virtual  President  of  the  country.  He  was 
twice  elected  to  that  high  office,  and  the  other  persons  nomi- 
nally raised  to  that  dignity  were  entirely  subject  to  his  influ- 
•  ence,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Vargas,  were  obliged  to  with- 
draw from  it.  It  was,  therefore,  Paez  who,  for  seventeen  years, 
actually  governed  the  country.  At  the  election  of  1847  he  gave 
his  support  to  the  nomination  of  General  Monagas,  in  the 
expectation  that  he  would  prove  as  submissive  to  his  domina- 
tion as  other  Presidents  had  been,  but  he  was  fearfully  mistaken. 
General  Monagas  was  well  disposed  towards  the  party  who  had 
elevated  him  to  power,  but  their  pretensions  were  so  ex- 
aggerated, the  policy  they  required  him  to  adopt  was  so 
unconstitutional,  the  measures  they  insisted  upon  were  so  san- 
guinary, that  he  resolved  to  free  himself  from  the  shackles  they 
attempted  to  impose  upon  him  and  govern  for  himself.  Paez, 
on  finding  that  Monagas  was  not  the  puppet  he  had  expected — 


8704  ViS 


and  that  he  could  no  longer  pull  the  wires  as  he  had  so  long 
done,  was  determined  to  rid  himself  of  so  unexpected  an  ob- 
stacle to  his  views,  and  raised  the  standard  of  rebellion.  The 
result  of  this  has  been  seen.  Paez  has  been  sentenced  by  the 
Congress  of  his  country  to  perpetual  exile.  The  people  of 
New  York,  misled  by  the  pretended  facts  and  arguments  they 
had  so  constantly  read  in  a  few  journals  of  this  city,  looked  upon 
him  as  a  martyr  to  his  patriotism,  and  received  him  with  open 
arms.  The  Paez  party  had  styled  themselves  Constitutional- 
ists, when  every  act  of  theirs  was  an  attack  upon  the  constitu- 
tion they  had  sworn  to  defend ;  but  the  people  of  the  United 
States  having  heard  only  one  side  of  the  question  believed  these 
unfounded  assertions.  Within  the  last  few  months  a  portion  of 
the  press  of  the  United  States,  having  obtained  more  positive 
information  with  regard  to  these  matters,  has  placed  it  fairly 
before  the  public,  and  has  produced  some  change  in  public 
opinion.  It  is  for  the  purpose  of  entirely  dispelling  the  mist  of 
error  which  has  so  sedulously  been  raised,  that  we  present  a 
review  of  the  occurrences  which  compelled  Venezuela  to 
banish  from  her  soil  one  of  her  leading  men.  The  act  was 
necessary  for  her  own  tranquillity  and  the  security  of  her 
institutions,  which  were  threatened  with  destruction  by  the  in-> 
ordinate  ambition  and  self-will  of  one  who  ought  to  have  been 
the  foremost  to  sustain  her  freedom  and  defend  the  Law.  The 
greater  part  of  the  following  pages  have  been  extracted  from 
the  work  of  a  Venezuelan,  wrho  was,  for  many  years,  the 
friend  and  adherent  of  General  Paez,  one  who  has  long  been 
intimately  connected  with  the  administration  of  the  Republic, 
having  held  some  of  the  highest  offices  in  the  State,  and  who 
was  consequently  in  a  position  to  obtain  more  accurate  infor- 
mation on  the  events  in  question  than  almost  any  other  person. 
The  work  is  entitled  "  Apuntes  para  la  Ilistoria,"  or  "  Notes 
for  History,  on  the  Conspiracy  of  Paez  against  the  Institutions  of 
his  Country. " 


We  also  present  sketches,  drawn  by  the  same  hand,  of  the 
character  of  Monagas  and  Paez,  that  all  their  antecedents  may 
be  fully  understood  in  this  country,  and  because  they  answer 
satisfactorily  many  of  the  charges  brought  by  the  latter  against 
the  former,  in  his  letter  to  the  Tribune  of  the  23d  October. 
We  might  have  much  enlarged  upon  the  subject  with  regard  to 
Paez,  by  bringing  forward  matters  which  were  even  contained 
in  the  sketch  we  mention,  but  as  they  were  not  purely  political 
we  hare  refrained  from  doing  so.  What  we  now  give  will 
enable  every  unprejudiced  person  to  judge  correctly  of  the 
public  life  of  these  two  men. 


NOTES  FOR  HISTORY. 


AT  the  opening  of  the  electioneering  campaign  of  1846,  Gen. 
Paez  publicly  declared  that  he  had  no  candidate,  that  he  had 
no  one  to  propose,  and  that  he  would  obey  any  one  the  nation 
might  select  according  to  the  constitution.  He  remained  firm 
in  this  idea  until  the  month  of  June,  when,  on  his  return  from 
Apure,  perceiving  that  Guzman's  chance  of  being  elected  had 
greatly  gained  ground,  and  having  a  decided  terror  of  such  an 
event,  he  thought  that  he  ought  to  favor  one  of  his  opponents, 
and  the  one  who  was  the  most  likely  to  succeed.  Being  in  Ca- 
labozo,  he  there  first  manifested  his  inclination  for  the  election 
of  General  Jose  Tadeo  Monagas,  then  remembering  that  this 
General  had  said  to  him  in  1839,  that  thenceforward  their  two 
swords  should  be  but  one,  or  something  to  that  effect. 

Public  opinion  manifested  itself  still  more  openly  towards 
September,  when  it  appeared  divided  between  Monagas,  Guz- 
man and  Salom.  Guzman  being  set  aside  by  the  revolution  of 
September,  Blanco  became  the  third  candidate  ;  the  latter  and 
Salom  were  both  utterly  offensive  to  Paez,  for  they  were  per- 
haps the  only  two  chiefs  in  Venezuela  who  would  not  in  any 
way  recognize  his  influence  and  preponderance.  To  this  being 
added  the  appointment  of  General  Monagas  by  General  Sou- 
blette  as  second  in  command  of  the  constitutional  army,  and  in- 
dubitably by  agreement  with  Paez,  gave  additional  importance 
to  the  Monagas  party,  and  the  conduct  of  the  latter  in  the  Sep- 
tember crisis  turned  the  scale  of  public  opinion  completely  in 
his  favor. 


It  would  be  most  curious  to  expose  all  that  then  took  place  ; 
•we  cannot  flatter  ourselves  that  we  know  all  the  secret  springs 
which  were  set  in  motion  at  that  period  ;  we  shall,  however, 
set  forth  that  which  we  are  positive  is  correct. 

General  Paez  was  convinced  that  the  Presidency  of  General 
Monagas  was  the  most  suitable  to  his  views,  and  this  from  many 
special  personal  considerations  which  were  important  to  him, 
and  that  he  possessed  sufficient  popularity  to  insure  success  ;  he 
was  also  convinced  that  the  result  of  the  election  of  senators  and 
representatives  was  such,  that  either  he  himself,  or  some  of  his 
friends,  could  influence  at  least  the  half  and  one  more  of  the 
members  of  Congress  to  return  the  candidate  he  favored.  An- 
gel Quintero,  whom  he  had  retained  near  him  after  the  events 
at  Yuma,  saw  with  alarm  that  Monagas  was  a  candidate  for  the 
presidency,  and  offered,  in  a  thousand  ways,  to  make  up  mat- 
ters between  Salom  and  Paez.  His  offer,  which  many  thought 
judicious  caused,  the  question  to  be  settled  in  another  man- 
ner. 

It  was  necessary,  above  all,  to  ascertain  what  was  the  feeling  of 
Monagas  with  regard  to  the  fate  of  Guzman,*  and  how  he  would 
conduct  himself  towards  Paez,  and  with  this  view  commission- 
erg,  were  sent  to  him  to  promote  an  interview.  Their  meeting 
in  the  plains  was  twice  prevented  by  the  sudden  illness  of  Gen- 
eral Monagas,  and  at  last  it  remained  as  an  understood  thing, 
that  Paez  was  to  go  to  Ln,  Guaira  to  receive  him  on  his  land- 
ing there.  General  Monagas,  v/ho  could  not  comprehend  that 
a  man  was  to  be  killed  merely  because  a  party  desired  it,  point- 
ing him  out  as  a  necessary  victim  ;  a  party  at  the  head  of  which 
was  Paez,  and  who,  seeing  things  only  from  a  distance,  judged 
of  them  from  what  he  had  read  in  the  public  papers,  con- 
sidered Guzman  as  the  most  guilty  man  in  all  Venezuela,  and 

*  During  the  progress  of  the  election,  an  insurrectionary  movement  took 
place.  Guzman  was  accused  of  being  the  chief  instigator  and  leader  of  it-, 
and  was  condemned  to  death  by  the  oligarchical  party,  then  in  power. 


8 

so  considering  him,  his  language  would  necessarily  be  the  ex- 
pression of  his  opinion.  He  had  seen  General  Paez  supporting 
the  government,  he  knew  that  he  was  aiding  his  election,  had 
received  flattering  letters  from  him ;  he  could  not,  therefore, 
express  himself  in  any  other  terms  than  such  as  would  be 
pleasing  to  Paez,  and  the  commissioners  would  necessarily 
repeat  to  him  what  Monagas  said.  All  this  was  very  natu- 
ral, and  notwithstanding  the  suspiciousness  of  Quintero  and 
of  many  of  the  Oligarchists  of  Caracas,  who  had  been  alarmed 
at  the  non-realization  of  the  proposed  interviews,  yet  as  they 
were  obliged  to  vote  for  somebody,  and  the  moment  had  ar- 
rived for  doing  so,  they  determined  to  stand  the  hazard  of  the 
die  and  to  vote  for  Monagas.  It  was  not  in  the  hands  of  the 
President  whom  they  elected  that  they  thought  they  were 
placing  the  reins  of  government,  but  in  those  of  Paez,  whom 
they  thought  capable  of  fascinating  Monagas,  and  of  making 
him  bend  to  all  his  caprices.  Monagas  was  not  the  President 
for  whom  they  voted  ;  it  was  Paez  ;  and  all  that  they  have 
written  attributing  to  the  President  a  breach  of  faith  and  want 
of  consistency,  because  he  did  not  follow  out  the  views  of  the 
party  who  had  elected  him,  is  without  any  species  of  founda- 
tion, for  Monagas  well  knew  that  they  had  not  elected  him  of 
their  own  free  will,  but  that  being  compelled  to  choose  be- 
tween men  who  were  not  of  their  own  exclusive  faction,  they 
inclined  towards  the  one  who  appeared  to  them  as  the  most 
likely  to  be  managed  by  Paez  ;  so  that  this  very  election  of 
Monagas  was  an  insult  offered  to  him,  and  a  further  proof  that 
they  thought  not  of  the  welfare  of  their  country,  but  merely 
how  they  could  most  securely  continue  their  abominable  dom- 
ination. But  let  them  say  what  they  will,  let  them  allege 
what  they  may  please,  this  is  the  naked  truth,  divested  of  all 
the  ornaments  with  which  they  have  sought  to  conceal  it,  and 
General  Monagas  is  not,  as  they  have  imagined  him,  so  dull  of 
comprehension  as  not  to  have  seen  through  them.  To  prove 


that  which  is  above  written,  if  it  require  proof,  it  will  suffice 
to  cite  facts  which  are  abundantly  notorious,  and  which  cannot 
in  any  way  be  denied,  and  these  are  :  Firstly,  the  interest  which 
was  evinced  in  endeavoring  to  get  Monagas  to  see  and  com- 
promise himself  with  Paez  before  the  election  took  place,  and 
the  excessive  displeasure  with  which  the  party  received  the  in- 
telligence that  the  interviews  had  not  been  effected.  Secondly, 
the  missions  for  that  purpose,  and  also  with  that  of  ascertain- 
ing the  opinions  of  Monagas.  Thirdly,  the  great  pomp  with 
which  they  prepared  the  entrance  of  Paez  into  the  capital  on 
the  7th  of  February,  1847,  he  appearing  as  a  man  superior  to 
the  government,  to  the  President  elect,  and  as  the  only  support 
of  the  country  and  of  its  institutions.  Fourthly,  the  subsequent 
conduct  of  Paez,  who  stationed  himself  at  La  Guaira,  with 
Quintero  and  others,  to  surround  the  President  on  his  arrival, 
and  to  keep  at  a  distance  from  him  all  persons  not  connected 
with  the  domineering  club.  For  about  a  month  was  he  thus  ly- 
ing in  ambush,  notwithstanding  that  his  duties  as  General-in- 
Chief  of  the  army,  which  was  operating  against  Rangel,  called 
him  elsewhere.  Fifthly,  all  that  was  done  after  the  President 
did  arrive.  It  was  disgraceful  to  see  how  a  few  men  pretended 
thus  to  take  possession  of  the  first  magistrate  of  a  Republic, 
and  to  hear  them  flattering  themselves  that  he  would  act  only 
as  they  desired.  Sixthly,  the  administration  which  in  this  man- 
ner they  succeeded  in  getting  General  Monagas  to  appoint,  an 
administration  that  had  been  rejected  by  the  great  majority  of 
the  Republic,  by  many  of  these  very  oligarchists,  by  Soublette 
himself,  by  Dr.  Alegria,  and  so  many  others.  Seventhly,  the 
plan  which  Paez  and  Quintero  unfolded,  for  restricting  the  pop- 
ular suffrage,  and  of  appointing  Paez  general-in-chief  of  the 
militia,  even  to  making  him  independent  of  the  executive 
power.  Are  more  facts  than  these  required  ? 

The  tie  which  bound  together  all  this  tissue  of  abomina- 
tions was  at  once  shameful  and  horrible.     It  was  necessary  to 


10 

have  seen  and  been  acquainted  with  Paez  andQuintero  many 
years  previously,  and  also  at  this  period,  to  feel  assured  that 
they  were  the  same  men  who  had  in  former  days  thought  of  their 
country's  welfare,  although  they  did  so  while  taking  care  of 
their  own  ;  intractable  pride,  a  decided  resolution  to  preserve 
their  own  dominating  power,  at  any  cost  whatsoever,  and  even 
a  ferocity  till  then  unknown  in  our  annals,  all  this  could  have 
been  discerned  in  them  by  any  acute  observer.  We  know 
many  worthy  men,  many  who  are  reputed  oligarchists,  but 
who  in  reality  were  impartial  between  the  parties,  who 
solely  from  the  force  of  certain  circumstances,  and  from  fear  of 
the  power  of  Paez,  appear  to  be  oligarchists,  who  have  lament- 
ed in  conjunction  with  ourselves  the  reality  of  the  facts  to 
which  we  have  referred.  Unfortunately  they  were  not  so  in- 
timately persuaded  as  we  were  that  the  ideas  of  Paez  and 
Quintero  tended  to  a  real  conspiracy  against  our  institutions, 
that  it  was  necessary  to  oppose  the  realization  of  their  plan  be- 
cause it  involved  the  ruin  of  the  country,  that  there  was  no 
cause  to  fear  the  phantasma  with  which  they  strove  to  ter- 
rify the  unwary,  and  that  everything  well  considered,  it  was 
the  duty  of  every  good  citizen  to  continue  to  support  the  legi- 
timately constituted  Government,  which  moreover  clearly  ap- 
peared to  be  sustained  by  an  immense  majority,  a  fact  not 
very  frequent  in  history,  and  which  those  alone  would  pretend 
to  overlook  who  aspired,  at  all  hazards,  to  domineer  over  the 
country,  or  men  who  dared  not  venture  to  set  aside  Paez  and 
look  calmly  at  both  sides  of  the  question.  It  was  sufficient  to 
hear  them,  to  know  that  the  point  they  aimed  at,  v,ras,  that  a 
small  junta  of  men  should  concentrate,  and  secure  to  themselves 
unlimited  power  over  the  nation,  and  forever.  These  men,  in 
their  own  estimation,  alone  were  patriots :  they  alone  had  un- 
derstanding, and  possessed  feelings  of  honor,  they  alone  could 
serve  for  all,  and  nothing  more  was  wanting  but  that  they 
should  actually  swear  to  each  other  not  to  permit  any  one 


11 

who  was  not  so  sworn  to  be  appointed  to  any  public  office, 
whether  the  making  such  appointment  was  in  the  province 
of  any  public  authority,  or  depended  on  popular  election.  It 
will  scarcely  be  believed  that  in  a  republic  like  Venezuela 
such  a  project  could  have  been  conceived  by  only  a  few  indi- 
viduals, although  for  seven  years  it  had  been  rumored  that 
such  a  plan  existed ;  and  yet  these  are  the  facts,  and  such 
had  been  the  abuse  of  power  in  the  elections,  that  it  was 
impossible  that  the  eyes  of  the  great  national  majority  could  be 
any  longer  blinded,  and  more  especially  when  it  was  seen  that 
an  administration,  composed  of  these  very  men,  preferred 
throwing  up  their  places  rather  than  agree  that  the  President 
should  have  the  right  of  nominating  men  to  office  who  did  not 
belong  to  the  circle  of  the  adepts. 

The  Quintero  administration  fell,  because  he  and  his  clique 
alone  could  not  perceive  that  such  an  administration  was  im- 
possible in  the  existing  state  of  opinion  in  Venezuela,  and 
General  Monagas  began  to  govern  of  his  own  free  will;  he 
made  himself  independent  of  Paez,  and  this  sufficed  to  induce 
the  latter  to  declare  war  against  him.  The  conspirators,  (for 
they  deserve  to  be  so  called,)  had  decreed  the  death  of  Guz- 
man, and  insisted  that  it  would  be  the  salvation  of  the  country, 
because,  doubtless,  according:  to  their  erring  and  atrocious  mode 
of  viewing  things,  the  blood  of  Guzman  dividing  forever  the 
few  who  wished  to  shed  it  from  the  remainder  of  the  nation, 
would  insure  the  continuance  of  power  in  the  hands  of  those 
who  held  it,  from  the  close  union  in  which  they  would  be 
bound  together ;  they  also  meant  to  realize  their  plan  for 
restricting  the  popular  suffrage  and  that  of  an  extra  constitu- 
tional militia  Government.  The  President,  who  was  in  Aragua, 
and  ignorant  of  the  state  of  public  affairs,  had  believed  Guzman 
to  be  the  promoter  of  great  evils,  and  that  he  had  been  the  active 
-chief  of  the  conspiracy,  soon  discovered  that  in  reality  the  facts 
were  not  as  they  had  been  reported;  but  nevertheless  respect- 


12 

ing  three  consecutive  sentences  which  had  been  pronounced 
against  him,*  and  believing  that  vengeance  would  be  satiated 
and  angry  passions  calmed,  by  removing  from  the  scene  of  com- 
bat the  man  who  occupied  it  so  entirely,  commuted  the  penalty 
of  death  to  which  Guzman  had  been  condemned  for  that  of 
perpetual  exile ;  and  here  we  have  his  great  crime, — here  we 
have  the  great  reason  for  calling  him  a  traitor,  and  accusing  him 
of  a  breach  of  faith — here  we  have  the  motive  for  declaring 
war  against  him  to  the  death,  and  for  immediately  commencing 
to  conspire  against  his  authority — here  we  have  the  true  cause 
of  all  that  subsequently  ensued.  We  recollect  that  talking  at 
the  time  when  this  commutation  took  place,  with  men  who 
were  conversant  with  the  intentions  of  the  conspirators  they 
frequently  repeated  to  us,  "  Monagas  will  infallibly  /a//,  there  h 
no  possible  reconciliation  with  him :  there  is  no  remedy,  he  will 
fall,  he  will  fall,  he  will  fall!  they  will  overthrow  him,  irremedi- 
ably they  will  overthrow  him!'1''  and  we  have  besides  many 
other  private  reasons  for  believing  that  from  that  moment  was 
concerted  the  conspiracy  which  we  have  seen  unfold  itself  in 
January  and  February  1848. 

*  Guzman  had  been  condemned  to  death  by  the  judge  of  first  instance 
at  the  instigation  of  Quintero ;  then,  on  appeal  to  the  superior  court,  com- 
posed of  three  judges — all  being  members  of  the  oligarchical  party,  and 
appointed  by  this  same  minister  of  the  interior  and  of  justice,  the  sentence 
was  confirmed,  as  it  was  also  by  the  supreme  court ;  but  the  latter,  being  unable 
to  commute  the  penalty  which  had  been  pronounced  by  two  courts,  strongly 
recommended  the  prisoner  to  the  mercy  of  the  Executive.  "_'/_ 

The  party  felt  so  certain  that  Guzman  would  be  shot  that  they  caused 
a  communication  to  be  opened  through  a  wall  of  the  church  of  San  Jacinto,  that 
the  prisoner  might  be  conducted  to  the  public  square  of  that  name  without 
being  led  round  through  the  streets,  fearing  that  the  people  might  attempt 
to  rescue  him.  One  of  the  representatives  (Juan  Garcia,  a  carpenter,)  sponta- 
neously constructed  a  bench  upon  which  Guzman  was  to  be  shot,  and  made  the 
coffin  in  which  he  was  to  be  buried.  This  man  was  one  of  those  who 
rushed  from  the  hall  of  Congress  in  the  melee  of  the  24th  of  January,  and  was 
killed.  Singularly  enough,  he  was  buried  in  the  very  coffin  he  had  prepared 
for  Guzman. 


13 

It  is  true  that  Paez  ostensibly  spoke  and  wrote  letters  advis- 
ing that  the  constitutional  President  should  be  sustained  ;  but 
as  it  is  not  from  mere  words  that  history  is  to  judge,  but  from 
facts,  we  shall  continue  to  relate  the  most  notorious  ones, 
and  which  prove  that  Paez  at  first  said  one  thing  but  thought 
another.  This  is  by  no  means  a  rare  occurrence  :  on  the  con- 
trary it  is  one  that  frequently  happens,  particularly  with  men  of 
his  crafty  nature,  and  it  is  known  that  history  will  never 
be  able  to  absolve  even  Bolivar  from  having  aspired  to  the  usurp- 
ation of  sovereign  power,  notwithstanding  his  protestations  to 
the  contrary,  and  this  only  because  his  intimate  adherents  acted 
as  if  in  reality  Bolivar  had  formed  such  intentions  When  men 
like  Bolivar,  Santander  and  Paez,  who  really  exercise  an  all- 
powerful  influence  over  those  who  are  attached  to  them,  and  of 
whom  they  are  the  sole  hope  and  rock  of  salvation — when,  we 
say,  such  men  really  and  positively  desire  a  thing  they  know 
how  to  act  and  express  themselves  so  that  their  real  desire 
shall  be  understood ;  they  know  how  to  select  a  Pedro  Bri- 
ceno  Mendez,  a  Soto,  a  Pena,  or  a  Quintero  who  are  deserv- 
ing of  their  entire  confidence,  who  have  publicly  the  reputa- 
tion of  enjoying  it,  and  who,  notwithstanding,  boast  that  they 
act  and  speak  with  perfect  liberty,  but  are  the  most  fitting  instru- 
ments through  whom  they  can  insinuate  their  real  desires  with 
all  the  sagacity  which  is  necessary  to  avoid  giving  any  explicit 
or  tangible  proof  against  them.  This  method  of  proceeding  is 
already  so  old,  it  is  moreover  so  natural  to  act  in  this  way,  that 
it  is  difficult  to  comprehend  that  ambitious  men  should  be 
so  dull  as  to  imagine  that  the  people,  so  deeply  interested 
in  observing  them,  do  not  see  through  it.  Of  what  service 
then  these  letters  and  these  formal  conversations  in  favor  of  the 
Government,  if  a  man's  acts  contradict  them  in  the  perception 
of  those  who  can  appreciate  them  ?  Let  us  proceed,  then,  to 
the  facts.  It  may  be  said  that  all  Venezuela  has  heard  Quin- 
tero boast  that  he  enjoyed  in  the  most  intimate  and  absolute 


14 

degree  the  confidence  of  Paez,  and  what  he  said  was  support- 
ed by  undoubted  facts.  Paez  began  in  1846  by  pardoning  the 
whole  of  the  insurgents  in  the  plains,  and  in  doing  so  exceeded 
his  powers,  for  it  was  not  within  his  province  to  pardon  the 
chiefs  ;  notwithstanding  this  he  pardoned  the  Herreras,  Cabeza, 
Ledesma,  and  Martinez,  who  were  not  only  chiefs  of  the  fac- 
tion but  criminals  of  an  atrocious  nature.  When  Quintero  saw 
this  he  flew  to  his  patron's  side,  and  instantly  Paez  changed  his 
conduct,  a  thing  of  which  Quintero  also  boasted,  without  re- 
flecting that  Paez  by  such  measures,  had  completely  and  effica- 
ciously tranquillized  the  plains. 

Paez  sent  Colonel  Austria  to  Caracas  upon  a  mission  of  peace 
and  the  reconciliation  of  all  parties,  the  result  of  which  was  to 
be  the  saving  the  life  of  Guzman  and  perfect  intelligence  and 
cordiality  between  men  of  all  opinions.  Austria  took  the 
necessary  steps  to  fulfill  his  mission,  and  his  first  measures 
were  attended  with  success  ;  but  Quintero  arrived  and  soon 
after  Paez,  and  then,  in  unison  with  those  who  in  Caracas  de- 
manded the  blood  of  Guzman,  undid  all  that  Austria  had  effect- 
ed and  forced  Paez  into  a  sanguinary  path,  wrhich  until  then  he 
had  avoided.  Quintero  followed  Paez  as  his  inseparable 
shadow,  and  carried  this  so  far  as  not  to  allow  him  to  speak  to 
any  one  in  Caracas,  excepting  those  who  supported  his  own 
views.  Quintero  was  Minister  of  Justice,  and  he  dictated  to 
the  judges  the  sentence  to  be  passed  on  Guzman,  and  after  leav- 
ing the  Government  house  he  would  call  on  Paez,  whose  face 
would  become  radiant  with  delight  at  the  audacity  with  which 
the  minister  (Quintero)  effected  such  surprising  things.  "  O  ! 
what  a  minister  !"  would  Paez  exclaim,  and  the  members  of 
the  Cabal  would  repeat  in  chorus  and  with  ferocious  joy,  "  Oh  ! 
what  a  minister  !  This  is  indeed  a  minister  !"  Quintero  re- 
signed his  portfolio  that  he  might  not  fail  in  the  minutest 
particle  of  his  plan  of  exclusive  domination,  and  Paez  reproved 
him  for  not  being  sufficiently  pliant  so  as  to  keep  in  till  he  saw 


15 

whether  it  would  not  be  possible  to  prevent  the  commutation  of 
GuzmaL's  sentence.  Quintero  and  the  directorial  Cabal  de- 
clared the  President  an  enemy  to  the  country  from  the  moment 
of  the  commutation  ;  what  they  undertook  was  not  a  constitu- 
tional opposition,  but  an  attack,  a  factious  conspiracy ;  the  lan- 
guage of  "  La  Pmzsa,"  and  of  the  "  Espectador"  from  the 
moment  of  their  publication,  was  easily  discerned  to  be  the 
language  of  disappointed  rage,  of  the  most  concentrated  indig- 
nation, which  admitted  no  medium,  and  which  had  no  other 
object  than  to  prepare  the  coalition  against  the  President  in  the 
Congress  in  order  to  depose  him  and  get  rid  of  him,  no  mat- 
ter by  what  means  ;  and  Paez,  whether  speaking  with  Quintero 
or  in  correspondence  and  continual  contact  with  the  directors 
of  the  intrigue  in  Caracas,  could  do  nothing  with  any  of  them  ; 
they  acted,  if  we  are  to  believe  him,  even  contrary  to  the  desire 
of  Paez,  who  wept  like  a  crocodile  over  the  evils  which  the  press 
occasioned,  and  this,  notwithstanding  their  editors  proclaimed 
him  "  the  centre  of  politics  and  the  sentinel  of  the  country,"  and 
openly  excited  certain  men  and  certain  districts  of  the  country, 
which  they  supposed  to  be  favorable  to  Paez,  to  prepare  them- 
selves to  sustain  him  in  an  enterprise  against  the  first  magis- 
trate. And  Paez  remained  silent  although  he  was  entreated 
in  every  way  to  reprove  these  manifestly  factious  tendencies, 
and  the  friends  of  Paez  in  Caracas  were  constantly  saying  that 
there  was  no  remedy,  that  if  he  did  not  cap:tulate  with  Paez 
the  President  must  fall,  and  other  similar  sayings,  and  Quin- 
tero went  and  came  from  Maracai  to  Valencia,  and  "  El  Es- 
pectador"  continued  more  and  more  acrid,  more  and  more  irre- 
concilable, and  the  principal  leader  of  the  conspiracy  in  Caracas 
wrent  to  Valencia  to  concert  measures  with  Quintero  and  to 
agree  in  the  sight  of  every  body,  to  plans  and  projects  of 
death  ;  and  Paez  was  tranquil,  and  Paez  approved  everything 
after  his  own  fashion,  although  he  was  always  talking  of  obedi- 
ence to  the  President  and  of  his  respect  for  the  Constitution ; 


16 

and  the  conspirators,  notwithstanding,  showed  themselves  more 
and  more  confiding  in  Paez.  Can  the  evidence  of  a  conspiracy 
be  clearer  than  this  ? 

The  party  asserted  that  the  conduct  of  the  Government,  in 
placing  arms  in  the  hands  of  those  whom  they  called  their  ene- 
mies, was  the  cause  of  the  progress  of  the  conspiracy;  that  the 
President  gave  offices  only  to  Reformers  or  Guzmanites,  the 
enemies  of  Paez,  whose  intention  it  was  to  militarize  the  coun- 
try, and  many  other  similar  stupidities ;  and  these  assertions  serve 
only  to  confirm  what  we  have  already  said  as  to  the  true  cause 
of  the  conspiracy,  that  is  to  say,  the  aspiring  to  retain,  at  any 
cost,  the  reins  of  power,  and  the  desire  to  secure  exclusive 
domination  in  the  hands  of  Paez  and  his  adherents.  As  they 
had  lost  all  public  opinion,  as  they  did  not  calculate  upon  the 
people  whose  right  of  suffrage  they  pretended  to  restrict,  they 
could  not  act  in  the  usual  legal  manner,  they  could  not  think 
of  contending  for  power  by  succeeding  in  the  elections,  and 
they  were  compelled  to  intrench  themselves  in  the  last  elected 
Congress,  in  which  they  could  hope  for  a  majority,  a  ma- 
jority which  had  been  obtained  by  innumerable  abuses  in  the 
preceding  elections.  Why  did  they  not  in  imitation  of  the 
conduct  of  the  liberal  party  propose  to  refer  to  public  opinion 
to  determine  whether  they  should  remain  the  arbiters  of  the 
nation's  destiny  by  means  of  a  triumphal  election  ?  Had  they 
not  before  their  eyes  the  noble  and  republican  example  of  a 
party  which,  during  the  space  of  seven  years,  had  gone  on 
steadily  gaining  ground  in  public  opinion  until  it  had  at  length 
completely  dispossessed  its  oligarchical  opponents?  If  the 
irregular  conduct  of  the  Government  was  the  cause  of  theirs, 
would  it  not  have  been  an  easy  matter  for  them  by  means  of  a 
dispassionate  and  decorous  discussion  to  have  enlightened  the 
nation  and  thereby  have  triumphed  in  the  elections  ?  No,  this 
was  not  the  cause  ;  they  had  lost  their  power  and  were  resolv- 
ed on  regaining  it  immediately,  not  by  the  means  of  public 
opinion,  but  by  a  conspiracy. 


17 

It  is  true  that  the  Government  sought  for  those  men  who 
stood  highest  in  public  opinion  in  order  to  give  them  places 
under  it ;  but  in  this,  far  from  failing  in  its  duty,  it  acted  with 
due  regard  to  truly  republican  principles,  and  it  mattered  little 
whether  they  had  been  reformers  in  1835  or  Guzmanites  in 
1846,  if  the  people  had  confidence  in  them  ;  but  it  was  pre- 
cisely this  that  the  conspirators  could  not  tolerate,  it  was  this 
that  most  irritated  them,  and  in  proportion  to  their  erroneous 
wanderings  it  was  necessary  the  vigilance  of  the  Government 
should  increase,  for  the  public  welfare  demanded  that  it  should 
not  trust  to  any  of  those  who  had  leagued  with  the  conspira- 
tors, and  from  not  having  rigorously  adhered  to  such  a  line  of 
conduct,  the  Government  has  frequently  been  deceived  and  im- 
posed upon.  It  is  necessary  to  repeat  over  and  over  again 
that  the  real  and  unpardonable  crime  of  which  the  Government 
was  guilty  in  the  eyes  of  the  conspirators,  was  the  not  having 
acquiesced  in  the  parricidal  and  atrocious  plan  of  Paez  and  Quin- 
tero,  to  sacrifice  Guzman,  diminish  the  popular  suffrage,  and  to 
raise  in  the  person  of  Paez  a  military  dictatorship,  superior  to 
the  Government  itself.  When  they  found  that  they  could  not 
obtain  the  sanction  of  Monagas  to  such  a  plan  they  declar- 
ed that  it  was  necessary  to  rid  themselves  of  him  at  any  cost, 
and  as  no  fraction  of  power  remained  to  them  excepting  through 
the  Congress,  they  appealed  to  it,  although  in  order  to  meet 
their  views  it  was  necessary  that  it  should  commit  an  abuse 
of  its  power. 

But  let  us  not  anticipate.  We  have  already  reached  the  20th 
of  January  1848  ;  it  is  necessary  we  should  refer  to  other  pre- 
vious acts.  The  morality  and  pretensions  of  the  conspirators 
may  be  judged  of  from  the  following.  Thinking  men  of  all 
parties  disapproved  of  the  excesses  of  the  press  anterior  to  the 
factious  movements  of  September  1846,  and  an  universal  clamor 
was  raised  for  the  reformation  of  the  law.  It  would  have  been 
thought  that  forming  the  jury  of  men  having  the  qualifications 
2 


18 

of  Senators,  would  have  offered  sufficient  guarantees  that  abuses 
of  the  press  would  not  be  tolerated,  and  although  the  law 
remained  extremely  restrictive,  General  Monagas  himself, 
without  being  much  influenced  thereto  by  Quintero,  ordered  it 
to  be  enforced  under  the  persuasion  that  it  was  necessary  to 
prevent  such  abuses  as  had  previously  taken  place.  The  law 
being  passed,  the  domineering  club  selected  their  jury  from 
among  the  most  prominent  men  of  their  party,  and  no  one  could 
have  imagined  that  such  men  would  ever  have  committed  the 
same  abuses  which  they  had  so  much  reprobated  in  the  Guz- 
manites  ;  but  it  was  seen,  and  with  astonishment,  that  the 
predictions  of  many  of  the  liberal  party  were  verified.  Two 
accusations  were  made  against  "  La  Prensa :"  they  we»e  clear 
and  demonstrated  with  admirable  reason  and  justice,  and  not- 
withstanding this,  these  men  declared  that  there  were  no 
grounds  on  which  to  form  an  action,  and  that  the  press  could, 
with  impunity,  serve  as  a  public  instrument  of  conspiracy,  de- 
famation and  contemptuous  ridicule.  Can  the  factious  tendency 
of  this  party  be  made  more  evident  ?  Could  the  President  rely 
upon  the  justice  and  impartiality  of  the  chamber  ?  And  this 
party  proceeding,  as  it  did  proceed,  by  factious  measures  with- 
out any  respect  whatsoever  to  law,  morality,  or  justice,  had  it 
any  right  to  pretend  that  consideration  for  it  should  be  retained  : 
That  which  they  still  enjoyed  they  abused  by  using  it  to  de- 
ceive, and  the  better  to  prepare  the  plans  for  their  conspiracy. 
We  were  placed  in  a  favorable  position  for  observing  all  that 
was  going  forward,  our  heart  free  from  hatred  and  rancorous 
passions — with  ardent  patriotic  feelings,  and  an  earnest  desire 
to  harmonize  the  contending  parties  and  thus  prevent  a  civil 
war  ;  we  did  not  omit  to  use  every  means  in  our  power,  that 
could  contribute  to  breaking  up  the  conspiracy,  and  particularly 
with  regard  to  its  chief  or  principal  head  and  sole  support, 
General  Paez,  who  is  essentially  responsible  for  the  evils  which 


19 

now  afflict  the  country  ;  and  in  proof  of  what  we  have  asserted 
we  will  also  refer  to  facts. 

The  first  is,  that  being  the  acknowledged  and  faithful  friend 
of  General  Paez,  as  soon  as  we  saw  the  turn  affairs  were  taking, 
and  not  yet  believing  in  those  who  so  strenuously  asserted  that 
he  was  incapable  of  tolerating  any  one  who  would  not  conduct 
himself  according  to  his  will,  we  addressed  ourselves  to  him  in 
private,  and  with  the  most  cordial  friendship  expressed  to  him 
our  views  upon  the  subject,  demonstrating  to  him  that  Quin- 
tero  was  conspiring — that  Quintero  was  much  injuring  him  in 
public  opinion,  and  that  if  he  did  not  publicly  reprove  the  use 
made  of  his  name  by  representing  that  he  was  the  head  of  a 
factious  opposition,  he  would  be  irretrievably  lost,  and  would 
appear  to  all  the  world  as  the  servile  imitator  of  Santander. 
We  endeavored  to  prove  to  him  that  he  ought  to  side  with 
the  community  at   large,  and   not  with   a  faction,  however 
wealthy  it  might  be  ;  that  it  was  the  people  who  had  aided  him 
in  acquiring  his  glory,  that  the  people  did  not  support  the  con- 
spirators, and  that  his  duty  and  his  interest,  if  he  wished  to 
save  himself,  called  upon  him  to  place  himself  at  the  head  of 
the  people  and  oppose  the  faction  who  were  conspiring  against 
the  President.     He  replied  to  us  in  a  careless,  negligent  man- 
ner, and  defended  Quintero.     We  again  wrote  to  him  with 
still  more  energy,  and  with  facts  and  incontestable  arguments, 
but  not  being  able  to  deny  the  truth  of  the  facts  nor  to  disprove 
the  correctness  of  the  arguments  we  brought  forward,  the  only 
answer  he  made  to  us,  was  to  tell  several  persons  in  Maracai 
that  we  had  lost  our  senses. 

Now  for  the  second.  Not  being  altogether  undeceived  by 
the  disappointment  we  had  undergone,  and  it  appearing  to  us 
that  General  Paez  might  desire  to  withdraw  himself  with  honor 
from  the  public  arena,  we  took  advantage  of  a  circumstance 
that  occurred,  to  ascertain  whether  His  Excellency,  the  Presi- 
dent, would  appoint  him  to  undertake  a  very  honorable  diplo- 


20 

matic  mission  in  Europe,  and  having  found  that  H.  E.  was  very 
favorably  disposed  to  such  a  measure,  we  wrote  to  General 
Paez,  stating  to  him  that  we  were  authorized  to  assure  him 
that  he  would  be  appointed  to  such  a  mission,  if  he  were  dis- 
posed to  afford  this  new  service  to  the  country.  He  replied  to 
us  that  he  could  not  say  whether  he  would  accept  it  or  not, 
because  there  were  family  occurrences  which  occupied  his 
mind  entirely,  and  as  no  formal  nomination  had  been  made,  he 
could  not  engage  to  think  upon  the  subject.  In  consequence, 
the  President,  who  did  not  wish  to  give  an  appointment  which 
might  be  scoffed  at,  deputed  a  respectable  person  of  Caracas 
to  go  to  Paez,  and  in  his  name  make  him  the  offer  of  the 
appointment,  and  the  result  was  another  disappointment. 

And  for  the  third.  During  the  few  days  which  General 
Juan  Jose  Flores  remained  in  Venezuela,  seeing  that  the  state 
of  society  threatened  a  civil  war,  from  the  exaggerated  pre- 
tensions of  the  conspirators  against  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public, he  endeavored  to  bring  about  a  meeting  between  General 
Paez  and  the  President,  at  which  they  might  devise  some 
means  for  putting  an  end  to  the  agitation  which  existed  in  men's 
minds.  The  sole  fact  that  any  one  should  conceive  it  necessary 
for  the  first  magistrate  of  a  republic  to  implore  the  influence  of 
a  citizen  in  order  to  restrain  a  small  portion  of  the  people  at 
whose  head  was  this  same  citizen,  is  in  itself  a  mournful  and 
degrading  fact  to  the  whole  nation — a  proof  that  there  existed 
a  citizen  superior  to  the  government,  to  the  institutions,  to  the 
laws,  and  even  to  the  nation  itself;  a  proof  that  this  citizen  is  the 
real  and  sole  arbiter  of  the  fate  of  the  nation,  and  as  soon  as 
such  a  state  of  things  manifests  itself,  the  nation  can  no  longer 
be  deemed  a  nation,  but  a  miserable  congregation  of  men  inca- 
pable of  being  free  and  governing  themselves  ;  because  at  any 
given  moment  this  man  might  disappear  from  the  face  of  the 
earth — this  man,  who  alone  is  the  people,  the  government,  the 
nation,  the  everything — and  the  nation  might  believe  itself 


21 

to  be,  or  be  really,  in  a  state  of  utter  anarchy.  Paez  was, 
according  to  his  partisans,  with  regard  to  Venezuela,  ten  times 
more  necessary  than  Bolivar  to  Colombia,  in  1829,  according 
to  the  Bolivarians.  In  such  a  state  of  things  we  also  thought 
it  a  patriotic  duty,  rather  than  be  exposed  to  a  civil  war — that 
the  President  should  not  refuse  to  see  Paez,  if  such  a  meeting 
could  be  efficacious  in  preventing  such  a  calamity.  General 
Flores  engaged,  no  doubt,  because  the  conspirators  exacted  it, 
that  the  President  should  go  as  far  as  Las  Cocuizas*  to  meet 
Paez,  and  we  could  not  induce  him  to  desist  from  this  preten- 
sion, although  we  considered  it  a  very  extravagant  one.  The 
President's  consent  was  obtained  to  go  that  distance  :  but  a  fit 
of  illness,  which  was  in  reality  severe,  whatever  may  have 
been  asserted  to  the  contrary,  prevented  him  from  undertaking 
the  journey.  We  felt  much  the  miscarriage  of  this  interview 
for  the  country's  sake  ;  however,  when  we  were  informed  of 
the  manner  in  which  Paez  presented  himself  at  Las  Cocuizas, 
we  were  highly  delighted  that  General  Monagas  had  not  been 
able  to  meet  him  there.  Paez  had  come  to  meet  the  Presi- 
dent accompanied  by  Quintero,  one  of  the  men  who  weekly 
vomited  forth  the  most  atrocious  insults  against  the  President 
in  his  newspaper,  the  "  Espectador,"  and  with  the  knowledge 
and  sufferance  of  Paez.  Could  there  be  a  more  uncourteous 
act  or  one  less  likely  to  promote  the  object  of  the  interview  ? 
Could  Quintero  be  an  element  of  union  or  of  concord  in  such 
circumstances  ?  However,  this  was  not  the  only  scandalous 
and  insolent  incongruity  in  the  conduct  of  Paez.  It  is  positive 
that  he  was  accompanied  by  a  hundred  men,  the  greater  part 
of  whom  were  armed  ;  whereas,  the  negotiator  of  the  interview 
had  engaged  that  neither  of  the  parties  should  take  with  him 
more  than  from  four  to  six  friends.  Paez  desired  to  present 
himself  to  the  President  at  a  distance  of  fourteen  leagues  from 
the  capital,  as  a  man  superior  to  him,  to  the  government,  to  the 

*  A  place  about  forty  miles  distant  from  Caracas. 


22 

institutions,  and  to  everything  ;  as  the  arbiter  of  Venezuela,  as 
the  representative  of  a  power  which  came  to  impose  conditions 
on  the  President  of  the  Republic,  if  he  meant  to  continue  in 
that  office.  And  is  there  a  Venezuelan  Republican  who  could 
witness  this  insolence  with  cold  blood  ?  Is  there  a  man  with 
any  feelings  of  dignity  who  believes  that  it  is  honorable  to  be- 
long to  a  nation  in  which  a  citizen  can  thus  ostentatiously  show 
himself  superior  to  its  first  magistrate  ?  Is  it  not  disgraceful 
even  that  this  should  be  a  question  between  republicans  ? 
Venezuela  had  flattered  one  of  her  sons,  honoring  him  and  re- 
warding him  far  beyond  what  his  services  had  merited,  and  in 
return  he  was  preparing  vexations  for  her,  and  threatening  to 
reduce  her  to  ashes  if  she  did  not  submit  to  him.  However, 
it  is  very  rarely  that  the  judgment  of  a  nation  goes  astray. 
From  all  quarters  of  Venezuela,  numberless  addresses  were 
received  deploring  the  projected  journey  of  the  President  to 
Las  Cocuizas,  and  afterwards  rejoicing  that  it  had  not  taken 
place,  and  announcing  to  him  that  its  realization  would  have 
produced  a  deplorable  effect  on  public  opinion  ;  so  natural  is  the 
feeling  of  national  dignity,  and  so  clear  was  the  necessity  for  its 
demonstration  on  this  occasion  !  ! ! 

Each  of  these  three  important  facts  we  have  just  narrated  is  so 
complicated,  and  involves  a  series  of  many  others  so  intimately 
bound  together,  that  to  a  man  of  impartial  judgment  either  of 
them  would  suffice  effectually  to  convince  him  that  General 
Paez  was  seriously  combining  a  conspiracy  that  should  indefi- 
nitely insure  to  himself  supreme  power.  This  was  clear,  most 
clear  ;  however,  that  which  placed  the  seal  of  evidence  on  the 
existence  of  the  conspiracy  was  the  fact  which  we  are  now 
about  to  add. 

Paez  had  precautiously  obtained  from  the  Soublette  govern- 
ment permission  to  absent  himself  from  the  country  ;  for  he 
had  said,  that  if  the  administration  which  was  to  follow  should 
not  be  favorable  to  him,  he  would  prefer  to  expatriate  himself 


rather  than  oppose  it,  or  remain  in  the  country  at  the  risk  of 
his  life.  This  sole  fact  demonstrates  the  importance  which  he 
assumed,  and  as  to  how  far  he  considered  it  necessary  that  the 
new  President  should  adopt  his  ideas  for  governing  the  country, 
or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  should  be  subjected  to  him.  That 
an  administration  should  act  against  the  opinion  of  a  man  like 
Paez,  who  was  at  the  head  of  a  party,  essentially  intolerant  and 
exclusive,  was  equivalent  to  being  an  insurrectionist ;  and  he 
could  not  consider  that  his  life  was  exposed  without  insulting 
and  throwing  discredit  on  the  government,  or  establishing  a 
pretext  to  rebel  against  it ;  so  that  Paez  could  see  no  mezzo 
termine  between  the  country  being  governed  by  himself  and  his 
party,  or  his  absenting  himself  from  it  in  order  not  to  become  a 
factious  oppositionist ;  offering,  nevertheless,  by  his  absenting 
himself  for  such  a  reason,  a  new  insult  to  the  government  and 
to  the  whole  republic.  These  fears  and  these  precautions  on 
the  part  of  Paez,  show  clearly  that  he  thought  more  of  himself 
than  of  his  country ;  for,  had  it  been  otherwise,  had  he  not 
entertained  these  misgivings,  had  his  conscience  been  clear, 
such  ideas  would  never  have  occurred  to  him ;  but  the 
man  who  aspired  to  impose  his  policy  upon  an  administration 
could  not  be  altogether  tranquil,  as  it  might  happen  that  he 
would  not  be  able  to  succeed  in  his  designs  ;  and  this  was  the 
reason  for  which  Paez  had  taken  the  precaution  so  long  before- 
hand of  asking  from  General  Soublette  a  permission  to  leave 
the  country.  We  shall  now  see  what  use  Paez  made  of  this 
permission. 

It  is  a  fact  that  in  the  month  of  December,  1847,  he  appeared 
in  the  eyes  of  the  whole  of  the  republic  to  be  at  the  head  of  the 
virulent  and  factious  opposition  formed  against  the  administra- 
tion ;  and  that  he  had  not  only  time  to  withdraw  himself,  but 
had  offered  to  him  a  most  honorable  means  of  absence,  which 
he  refused  to  accept.  It  was  at  that  time,  under  the  pretext  of 
some  cattle  business,  that  he  requested  permission  to  go  into 


24 

the  province  of  Casanare  (New  Granada,)  and  he  gave  to  this 
object  all  the  appearance  of  a  political  estrangement  from  Ve- 
nezuela, in  order  that  his  adherents  might  have  the  opportunity 
of  entreating  him  to  remain,  and  thus  obtain  a  public  document 
which  should  implicate  all  those  who  desired  his  political  pre- 
dominance. And,  in  fact,  all  the  conspirators  fulfilled  the  de- 
sires of  Paez  ;  for  they  drew  up,  on  the  26th  December,  at 
the  same  time  they  were  urging  the  interview  at  Las  Cocuizas, 
an  exposition  which  they  got  some  individuals  to  sign,  who  did 
not  at  all  understand  the  importance  and  factious  tendency  of 
the  step  they  were  taking. 

In  this  exposition  it  is  asserted  that  those  who  drew  it  up 
knew  that  Paez  was  thinking  of  abandoning  the  country ;  it 
is  clear  that  such  news  must  have  emanated  from  himself;  for, 
that  which  he  had  solicited  of  the  government  was,  not  to  be 
allowed  to  abandon  the  country,  but  a  permission  to  go  into  the 
New  Granadian  territory,  should  he  have  occasion  to  do  so, 
and  for  only  a  very  few  days,  if  the  motive  he  alleged  had  been 
the  true  one ;  and,  therefore,  the  request  he  had  addressed  the 
government  was  merely  a  pretext  by  which  to  give  publicity 
to  his  feigned  absence,  and  to  give  a  color  of  some  sort  to  the 
petition  which  induced  him  to  favor  us  by  remaining  to  direct 
the  conspiracy.  In  this  document  the  predominant  idea  was, 
wholesome  and  pernicious  doctrines  were  in  deadly  contest,  that 
the  latter  being  supported  and  extolled,  while  the  former  were  dis- 
credited from  their  appearance  of  weakness  ;  that  is  to  say,  that 
Paez  and  his  party  were  in  deadly  contest  with  the  govern- 
ment and  the  people  ;  was  not  this  insinuation  clear  enough  ? 
Is  it  not  evident  that  Paez  and  his  party  considered  themselves 
in  deadly  contest  against  the  government  and  in  favor  of  those 
wholesome  doctrines,  that  is  to  say,  supporters  to  the  death  of 
those  which  they  called  wholesome  doctrines,  by  means  of 
deeds,  of  arms,  and  of  conspiracy  ?  And  we  say  that  Paez  ac- 
knowledged this,  not  merely  from  the  exposition  having  been 
addressed  to  him,  but  because  in  his  reply  he  accepted  the 


25 

whole  context  of  such  manifestation.  "  1  have  before  me," 
he  says,  "  a  picture  of  the  Republic  most  gloomily  sketched ;" 
(the  deadly  contest  between  good  and  evil  doctrines,  between 
Paez  and  the  government  of  the  nation)  ;  and  then  he  adds, 
that  the  sole  feeling  he  could  express,  was  that  he  only  desired 
to  live  that  he  might  be  useful  to  his  country  !  and  this  he  says 
in  relation  to  the  idea  that  the  government  was  sustaining  evil 
doctrines  and  that  they  were  in  deadly  contest  with  the  good 
ones ;  therefore  it  is  clear  that  he  proposed  to  himself  to  be 
useful  to  his  country  in  this  deadly  contest,  and  this  in  what- 
ever light  it  might  be  considered,  may  surely  be  termed  de- 
claring himself  in  open  rebellion. 

In  the  whole  of  this  manifestation  nothing  more  is  done  than 
to  develop  this  idea  of  the  deadly  contest  in  which  it  is  said 
were  engaged  the  good  and  the  evil  doctrines,  assuming,  before 
it  had  ever  met,  that  the+Congress  was  in  combat  with  the  Ex- 
ecutive Power.  And  this  was  said  by  an  infinitisimal  portion  of 
the  Venezuelan  community,  which  had  arrogated  to  itself  the 
right  of  declaring  war  by  anticipation  between  the  national 
powers  ;  this  was  said  to  a  citizen  who  was  General-in-Chief  of 
the  Republic  ;  who  ought  to  have  been,  from  many  reasons, 
the  most  obedient  of  all  citizens ;  and  this  was  said  to  the  very 
face  of  the  Government ;  this  citizen  thus  recognized  as  the 
chief  of  a  party  and  assenting  to  be  so  recognized,  instead  of 
calling  his  partisans  to  order,  and  telling  them  that  he  could  not 
accept  the  declaration  which  they  had  made  of  the  national 
powers  being  in  contention,  that  this  was  anticipating  the 
decision  of  Congress  upon  the  subject,  prejudging  its  determi- 
nation, and  divesting  its  decisions  of  all  justice,  and  impartial 
character,  and  in  short,  instead  of  saying  to  them,  we  are  not 
the  judges  of  the  Government,  you  speak  the  language  of  a 
faction  and  I  cannot  approve  your  language  without  being  com- 
promised myself ;  instead  of  acting  thus,  we  say,  he  comes  out 
with  an  offer  of  his  services  to  the  country,  assuming  as  posi- 


26 

tive  and  actually  existing,  all  that  a  factious  club  had  been 
pleased  to  assert.  It  is  seen,  therefore,  that  Paez  and  his  par- 
tisans were  openly  conspiring  before  the  meeting  of  Congress, 
and  from  all  this  may  be  clearly  deduced  that  the  plan  of  the 
manifest,  and  the  reply  to  it,  with  the  pretext  of  his  absence, 
were  all  combined  and  agreed  upon  with  two  objects  which  are 
extremely  evident*  1st.  That  Paez  desired  that  his  partisans 
should  compromise  themselves  in  an  explicit  manner,  and  by 
their  signatures,  that  he  might  have  that  support  and  pretext, 
and  that  this  declaration  of  the  conspiring  club  being  echoed 
throughout  the  Republic,  the  party  in  all  points  of  it  might 
prepare  themselves  to  second  the  views  of  the  director.  2d. 
Paez  wished  to  say  to  his  partisans  in  Congress,  Be  not  alarmed, 
my  friends,  I  have  already  given  you  the  example,  I  have  com- 
promised myself,  now  do  you  finish  your  part  of  the  work  by 
giving  me  the  power,  and  we  will  divide  the  prize  between  us  ; 
/  have  a  rope  round  my  neck,  will  you  leave  me  in  that  position  1 
Can  there  be  any  doubt  that  members  of  Congress,  partisans  of 
Paez,  could  be  otherwise  than  conspirators  ?  On  the  13th  of 
January  the  party  in  Calobozo  repeated  the  same  farce  which 
had  been  played  by  the  200  in  Caracas  with  regard  to  the  man- 
ifesto ;  the  same  ideas  were  prominently  brought  forward  by 
them,  the  supplication  as  to  the  absence  of  the  only  centre  of 
union,  the  support  of  all  good  doctrines,  of  all  hopes  of  salvation, 
the  threatened  death  which  the  administration  was  about  to  in- 
flict on  the  institutions,  and  its  contention  with  the  Congress  not 
yet  assembled,  fyc.  But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  in  the  exposition 
of  the  Calabozo  party,  and  this  history  will  duly  note,  the  lan- 
guage is  more  explicit,  more  resolute,  much  less  obscure ;  and 
this  was  because  the  time  was  drawing  nearer  and  Paez  was 
already  in  campaign  in  the  Llano.  They  no  longer  talked 
merely  of  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  being  in 
contention,  but  said  that  it  was  necessary  that  Paez  should 
hold  himself  ready  to  execute  the  orders  of  the  Congress. 


27 

What  then  were  these  orders  the  execution  of  which  was  not 
to  be  confided  to  the  Executive  Power  ?  They  could  be  no 
other  than  those  of  the  conspiracy.  Paez  answered  in  the 
same  sense  as  to  the  address  from  Caracas,  and  also  with  more 
freedom,  less  concealment.  "  The  picture  you  have  drawn  to  me 
of  the  actual  state  of  the  Republic  is  a  mournful  one.  The  Re- 
public cannot  be  lost,"  he  says,  "  Providence  has  not  denied  to 
us  its  protection,  and  within  six  days  the  Congress  will  have 
assembled;  from  its  enlightened  knowledge,  its  patriotism  and 
energy,  we  may  expect  every  benefit.  My  duty  is  to  sacrifice 
myself  for  the  country,  <Sfc."  We  have  here  the  same  ideas, 
more  openly  avowed,  in  order  to  animate  the  Congress,  or  his 
partisans  who  formed  a  portion  of  it,  that  he  might  not  be  left 
entirely  to  his  own  resources.  What  would  have  become  of 
Paez  after  these  answers,  if  the  Congress  had  not  responded  to 
his  hopes  ? 

It  is  clear  that  he  would  have  been  a  lost  man,  and  it  is  also 
clear  that  for  men  who  were  compromised  and  wished  to  be 
consistent,  there  was  no  other  course  to  take  than  to  execute 
the  plans  which  such  answers  referred  to.  And  the  represen- 
tatives, who  were  about  to  arrive,  to  be  judges  under  such 
influences,  would  they  have  their  souls  free  and  their  hearts 
tranquil,  as  the  proper  fulfillment  of  their  duty  required  they 
should  be  ?  Were  they  or  were  they  not  members  of  the  fac- 
tion ?  And  let  it  be  observed  that  the  exposition  from  Cala- 
bozo  and  the  reply  to  it  were  published  in  "La  Prensa"  of  the 
23d  of  January,  THE  VERY  DAY  ON  WHICH  THE  CONGRESS  WAS 
INSTALLED,  and  to  which  were  added  games  of  the  self-same 
nature,  played  between  the  inhabitants  of  San  Sabastian  and 
Paez,  and  between  some  few  children  of  Calabozo  and  Paez. 
In  a  Republic  which  possessed  a  Constitution  and  Laws  and 
Government  and  People,  children  were  taught  to  say  to  Paez, 
"  It  is  enough  for  you  to  know  that  we  are  Calabozians,  to  be 
assured  that  we  are  lovers  of  order,  and  that  Paez  is  our  pre- 


28 

dominant  idea."  That  children  should  proclaim  a  man  to  be 
their  predominant  idea  !  Was  ever  such  prostitution  heard  of,  or 
a  greater  relaxation  of  wholesome  principles  ?  Were  these  the 
good  doctrines  they  were  defending  ?  Could  they  venture  to 
say  so  without  shame  ?  It  is,  however,  demonstrated  by 
conclusive  arguments  that  the  circulation  of  the  notice  of  Paez's 
intended  withdrawal  from  the  country  was  but  a  stratagem 
which  should  afford  his  partisans  an  opportunity  of  addressing 
factious  manifestoes  to  him,  to  which  he  might  reply  in  terms 
which  conveyed  this  meaning  to  the  Representatives  :  "  Do 
you  but  act  according  to  my  wishes  and  you  may  rely  on  me 
and  on  all  those  who  are  thus  implicated  ;"  and  consequently 
it  is  also  proved  that  a  Chamber,  the  majority  of  which  was 
composed  of  men  intimately  connected  with  Paez  and  his  faction? 
and  many  of  them  active  coadjutors  in  the  preparatory  measures 
of  the  conspiracy,  was  not  in  reality  what  the  Constitution  re- 
quired a  legislative  chamber  should  be,  that  is  to  say,  dispassion- 
ate, just,  impartial  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  gang  of  partisans 
resolved  on  abusing  the  power  which  had  been  confided  to  them 
for  the  good  of  the  country,  under  the  pretext  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  upholding  evil  doctrines,  but  in  reality  trumped  up  in 
order  to  favor  the  usurpation  of  public  power  meditated  by  the 
man  who  could  not  tolerate  that  the  country  should  be 
governed  without  consulting  him. 

Another  public  and  scandalous  act  was  performed  by  Paez 
and  Quintero  that  no  doubt  might  remain  as  to  their  inten- 
tions, and  that  the  representatives  who  were  compromised 
should  not  vacillate,  from  being  alarmed  at  the  enormity  of  the 
criminal  attempt  they  meditated.  The  act  was  this :  The 
former  sent  his  family  to  Caracas,  recommended  to  the  protec- 
tion of  a  foreign  diplomatic  agent,  in  order  that  he  might 
give  them  an  asylum  in  his  house  should  it  become  necessary, 
and  taking  measures  in  a  public  manner  to  obtain  lodgings  for 
them  as  near  as  possible  to  the  house  of  the  said  diplomatic 


29 

agent ;  and  Quintero  acted  in  much  the  same  way,  giving 
orders  that  his  family  should  embark  for  Curazoa,  while  they 
both  marched  together  toward  Calabozo.  And  can  any  one 
doubt,  after  all  that  hasvbeen  stated,  that  when  Paez  and  Quin- 
tero, in  the  early  part  of  January,  proceeded  toward  Calabozo, 
they  were  at  that  very  moment  in  insurrection  against  the 
government  and  the  institutions  ?  And  we  will  again  ask, 
what  would  the  fate  of  Paez  hdve  been  if  the  Chamber  of 
Representatives,  even  without  consideration  to  the  justice  of 
the  case,  had  at  least  paused  before  the  idea  of  launching  Ven- 
ezuela into  civil  war,  the  only  motive  for  which  was,  that  the 
administration  would  not  adopt  the  ideas  of  an  exclusive  and 
cruel  club  ?  What  would  have  been  the  situation  of  Paez  who 
had  defied  the  government,  and  had  commenced  the  rebellion 
as  a  power  capable  of  itself  to  command  in  Venezuela,  and  to 
prevail  over  government  and  people,  and  who  had  carried  this 
to  such  a  point  that  it  was  already  impossible  for  him  to  retro- 
cede  with  honor  ?  We  do  not  know  how  he  would  have  acted 
in  such  a  case,  but  this  is  perfectly  clear,  that  his  friends  and 
partisans,  seeing  their  chief,  their  only  hope,  thus  rushing 
onward,  would  have  considered  themselves  no  longer  at  liberty 
even  to  deliberate,  and  their  only  alternative  would  have  been 
either  to  sacrifice  him  or  to  follow  him  in  the  rebellious  path 
he  had  pursued  :  and  it  could  not  be  doubted  that  in  the  ex- 
cited state  of  passions  at  that  moment,  and  which  they  them- 
selves had  so  much  aided  to  produce,  they  would  have  adopted 
the  latter  course.  They  called  themselves  the  intellectual 
party,  and  in  truth  they  showed  no  lack  of  skill  in  plotting  the 
conspiracy. 

Profound  impressions  are  still  produced  upon  our  mind  by 
even  the  recollection  of  what  we  saw  and  heard  between  the 
15th  and  the  24th  of  January,  and  we  nevertheless  feel  a  cer- 
tain species  of  intimate  conviction  that  it  would  be  difficult 
to  find  any  other  person  whose  soul  and  heart  were  so  com- 


30 

pletely  disposed  to  observe  with  perfect  impartiality  the  conduct 
of  all  the  parties,  and  to  judge  which  of  them  acted  with  most 
reason,  most  justice,  and  most  prudence.  Being  connected  with 
persons  who  were  intimately  acquainted  with  the  operations 
of  the  one  and  the  other,  and  enjoying  their  confidence,  we  are 
in  a  position  to  estimate  the  part  which  each  took  in  all  that 
then  occurred ;  but  our  Notes  cannot  enter  into  all  these  de- 
tails ;  it  is  necessary,  at  the  present  moment,  to  omit  the 
names  of  individuals  and  to  refer  only  to  acts  of  public  noto- 
riety ;  time  will  withdraw  the  veil  which  we  now  leave 
over  a  part  of  the  events. 

As  soon  as  it  was  seen  that  Paez  and  Quintero  had  set  out 
for  the  Llano,  in  the  early  part  of  January,  and  the  arrange- 
ments they  had  made  for  their  families  became  known,  there 
remained  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  they  had  resolved  to  rise 
in  rebellion  against  the  Government,  and  that  they  evidently 
calculated  on  the  necessary  majority  in  the  chambers  to  realize 
their  views.  But,  however  clear  this  might  appear,  it  was  not 
possible  that  men  of  sound  judgment  could  persuade  them- 
selves, that  the  perturbation,  which  passion  produces,  could 
reach  so  extreme  a  point  as  to  blind  the  most  sagacious,  nor 
that  confidence  in  the  omnipotence  of  Paez  could  extend  so 
far  as  to  induce  them  to  suppose  that  a  handful  of  satellites  and 
some  500  or  1000  men  at  the  utmost,  who  would  follow  him, 
could  subjugate  such  a  Republic  as  Venezuela.  We,  who 
knew  Venezuela,  and  knew  the  state  of  public  opinion  at  the 
moment,  ventured  to  speak  of  it  to  some  of  the  representa- 
tives and  senators  among  those  who  were  reputed  hostile,  and 
those  who  did  not  impute  our  doing  so  to  unkindness,  carried 
their  blindness  so  far  as  to  assure  us  that  we  were  altogether 
mistaken,  that  we  should  see  the  property  of  General  Mona- 
gas  razed  to  the  ground,  and  the  Republic  completely  under 
the  dominion  of  Paez  ;  some  of  them  even  going  so  far  as  to 
make  reflections  on  our  own  individual  position,  and  advising 


31 

us  to  save  ourselves.  We  must  confess,  that  as  to  those  who 
knew  the  circumstances,  they  inclined  to  believe  that  public 
opinion  would  maintain  itself  with  firmness  and  unanimity  ;  but 
it  was  of  no  use  whatever  for  them  to  prognosticate  what 
would  happen,  as  it  occurred  to  ourselves,  for  example,  re- 
garding General  Munoz  upon  whom  the  partisans  pf  Paez  ven- 
tured to  calculate,  although  we  never  for  a  moment  had  the 
slightest  doubt  as  to  the  fidelity  of  General  Munoz,  and  this 
we  declared  to  every  one  with  whom  we  spoke  upon  the  sub- 
ject; however,  and  it  is  melancholy  to  relate  it,  derision*  was 
the  only  answer  we  received  from  some  of  them,  so  fascinated 
were  they  by  the  prestige  of  a  man  !  This  raised  a  feeling  of 
pity  in  our  breast  for  these  mistaken  individuals,  but  bitter 
grief  as  it  regarded  our  country,  for  it  convinced  us  of  the 
tenacious  and  even  stupid  blindness  of  the  conspirators.  Un- 
fortunately, neither  reason  nor  reflection  were  of  any  avail  with 
men  who,  when  they  were  asked  what  was  the  chief  motive 
which  could  have  occasioned  this  accusation  of  the  Presi- 
dent, replied  immediately  by  uttering  some  gross  stupidity, 
as  for  instance,  one  which  we  cannot  avoid  recording,  "  the 
death  of  Alexander  the  Great,"  and  if  they  were  spoken 
to  of  the  opinion  of  the  people,  added,  in  a  tone  of  security, 
perfectly  astounding,  "  Oh!  they  can  be  managed  with  whips." 
It  was  certainly  unquestionable  that  the  conspirators  were  very 
determined  to  strike  at  all,  institutions,  country,  property, 
honor  and  life  ;  because  they  were  persuaded  that  the  only 
difficulty  which  existed  was  in  Paez's  finding  a  pretext  for 
taking  up  arms  ;  they  wished  to  bring  about  this  result,  let 
the  means  be  what  they  might,  it  appearing  to  them  impossi- 
ble that  they  could  do  otherwise  than  triumph  ;  and  thus,  and 
only  thus,  can  be  explained  the  conduct  of  the  conspirators. 
We  however  repeat,  and  it  is  a  fact  that  cannot  be  subjected 
even  to  a  doubt,  that  the  opinions  and  plans  of  the  conspira- 
tors from  the  moment  of  the  breaking  up  of  the  Quintero  min- 


32 

istry  and  the  commutation  of  Guzman's  sentence,  were  founded 
only  upon  the  knowledge  which  they  had  of  Paez's  mode  of 
thinking,  and  on  the  persuasion  of  his  infallible  omnipotence. 

Setting  out  upon  this  basis,  and  that  of  the  hostile  position 
which  Paez  had  already  assumed,  the  conspirators  considered 
themselves  certain  of  a  triumph,  and  that  within  a  very  few 
days  ;  and  they  did  not  at  all  question  the  legality  of  their  pro- 
ceedings ;  "  we  have,"  said  they,  "  more  than  the  number  of 
votes  required  to  suspend  a  president ;  and  now  we  have  only 
to  do  so  :"  and  because  some  of  them  called  themselves  the 
Chamber  of  Representatives,  they  imagined  that  this  was  not 
as  factious  and  unconstitutional  an  act  as  those  of  Ranjel,  the 
Herreras,  &c. ;  it  was,  in  our  conception,  much  more  criminal, 
since  they  were  intentionally  committing  an  abuse  of  that 
power  which  was  conferred  upon  them  solely  that  they  might 
act  justly  and  always  with  due  regard  to  the  welfare  of  their 
country,  whereas  they  were  endeavoring  to  light  up  the  flames 
of  civil  war  because  it  tallied  with  the  views  of  a  very  scanty 
number  of  partisans  and  those  of  an  ambitious  man,  who  was 
their  leader. 

It  is  afflicting  to  remember  the  fury  which  possessed  the 
minds  of  the  conspirators  for  some  days  preceding  that  of  the 
24th  January,  and  it  was  impossible  for  a  philosophic,  patriotic 
and  just  man  to  recognize  in  those  madmen  the  judges  of  an  ad- 
ministration, which  might  have  committed  errors,  but  which 
had  never  omitted  to  respect  the  Constitution,  even  when  in 
the  midst  of  circumstances  that  rendered  necessary  the  adop- 
tion of  strong  measures  in  order  to  avoid  infinite  disasters.  It 
is  therefore  a  well  ascertained  fact,  that  thirty-two  members 
of  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  had  agreed  on  deposing  the 
President,  and  on  removing  their  sittings  to  some  other  city,  if 
they  should  judge  proper  so  to  do,  that  they  might  strike  the 
blow  with  greater  security.  And  to  this  had  Paez  led  them 
by  the  tortuous  paths  which  we  have  now  exposed.  They 


33 

were  not  the  conscript  fathers  of  the  country  who  came  with 
tranquil  hearts,  and  bandaged  eyes,  holding  the  scales  of  just- 
ice to  deliberate  upon  his  fate ;  but  the  inveterate,  furious 
and  public  enemies  of  the  President  who  had  engaged  to  de- 
pose him.  It  is  a  pity  that  they  had  not  the  opportunity  of 
unfolding  the  whole  of  their  plan,  for  we  have  the  intimate  con- 
viction that  they  intended  to  turn  against  the  Vice-President 
of  the  Republic  also,  in  the  event  of  his  not  blindly  adopting 
their  projects,  which  consisted  in  giving  Paez  a  dictatorial 
power  while  they  were  judging  and  assassinating  the  President, 
and  this  being  done,  to  maintain  him  in  it  during  the  whole 
time  that  Providence  should  please  to  preserve  his  life.  The 
conspirators  had  reached  such  a  degree  of  excitement  as  to  the 
necessity  for  altering  the  institutions  of  the  country,  that  they 
spoke  of  it  with  barefaced  effrontery,  and  they  looked  upon 
the  deposition  of  the  President  but  as  a  means  by  which  they 
should  attain  that  object.  This  is  the  truth  in  all  its  splendor, 
let  them  now  say  what  they  please ;  at  all  events,  it  is  the 
truth  with  regard  to  the  few  conspirators  who  directed  the 
manoeuvres  which  were  to  produce  as  their  result  the  establish- 
ment, during  his  life,  of  the  power  of  Paez,  and  this  was  what 
was  perfectly  understood  by  the  President,  and  by  the  whole 
people  of  Venezuela,  when  the  Congress  was  installed  on  the 
23d  of  January,  1848. 

In  the  eighteen  years  of  national  life  which  Venezuela  has  en- 
joyed under  its  present  Constitution  it  has  been  observed  that 
in  all  periods  of  conflict  the  deputies  attended  Congress  with 
great  punctuality  ;  but  on  this  occasion  it  was  remarked  that 
there  was  a  visible  reluctance,  and  we  who  know  the  personal 
character  of  the  tardy  ones,  may  venture  to  assert  that  the  de- 
lay in  their  attendance  arose  from,  either  their  being  forewarned 
of  the  attempt  about  to  be  made,  in  which  it  was  intended  to 
implicate  them,  or  being  acquainted  with  the  arrangements  and 
plan?  of  their  co-members,  and  feeling  that  they  had  not  suffi- 
3 


34 

cient  resolution  to  oppose  them,  they  did  not  desire  to  participate 
in  such  a  responsibility  ;  and  thus  it  was  that  at  the  installation 
of  the  23d  January,  1848,  nineteen  of  the  representatives  failed 
to  attend,  of  whom  nearly  the  whole  have  stated  to  us  that 
they  were  either  friendly  to  the  administration,  or  that  they 
were  impartial ;  that  they  were  not  prejudiced,  but  were  resolved 
to  act  with  the  independence  and  justice  of  faithful  representa- 
tives. But  for  the  clamorous  proceedings  of  the  conspiracy,  at 
such  a  period,  the  whole  of  the  representatives  would  hare  has- 
tened to  the  Congress,  and  the  conspirators  on  finding  that 
they  could  not  have  calculated  positively  on  two-thirds  of  the 
rotes  in  favor  of  the  accusation,  would  perhaps  have  changed 
their  course  and  listened  to  some  virtuous  and  learned  men,  who, 
like  the  unfortunate  Santos  Michilena,  constantly  opposed  these 
traitorous  views.  It  moreover  was  part  of  the  plan  of  the  con- 
spirators, not  only  to  give  confidence  by  their  preparatives  to 
those  who  supported  their  ideas  that  they  might  remain  firm , 
but  also  to  retard  the  attendance  of  the  timorous,  and  by  those 
means  securely  gain  the  required  majority  in  the  Chambers,  to 
carry  out  their  object.  As  to  ourselves,  notwithstanding  all 
this,  we  remained,  up  to  the  23d,  in  the  belief  that  a  feeling  of 
duty  would  have  more  weight  upon  the  minds  of  the  delegates 
of  the  nation,  than  the  influence  of  the  omnipotence  of  Paez, 
and  we  frequently  discussed  the  matter  with  this  feeling,  calcu- 
lating, we  must  acknowledge,  on  the  declarations  of  some  per- 
sons, which,  from  subsequent  facts,  we  infer  were  not  sincere. 
Although  we  were  assured  that  such  a  one  and  such  a  one 
were  implacable  enemies  of  the  administration,  we  maintained 
that  certain  men  should  not  be  judged  of  lightly,  and  we  advis- 
ed those  who  spoke  with  us  upon  the  subject  to  wait  the  result, 
which  we  imagined  would  be  very  different. 

And  therefore  was  it,  that  when  we  were  informed  on  the 
33d,  that  out  of  forty-four  representatives  thirty-two  had 
voted  for  the  removal  of  the  sittings  to  Porto  Cabello,  we  were 


perfectly  astounded.  It  appears  that  the  people  of  the  capital, 
for  the  most  part,  felt  as  we  did  with  regard  to  the  Chambers, 
and  that  sincerely  and  affectionately  attached  to  the  President 
of  the  Republic,  they  had  relied  on  the  justice  and  impartial- 
ity of  the  majority  of  the  legislative  body,  and  that  it  would 
prevent  the  realization  of  the  threats  of  the  inconsiderate  writ- 
ers of  the  furious  opposition.  However,  the  vote  of  the  23d 
for  transferring  the  sessions,  and  the  measure  of  the  chamber 
by  which  it  voted  for  itself  a  guard,  indefinite  in  number  and  to 
be  selected  by  itself,  opened  the  eyes  of  every  one,  and  it  was 
seen  that  a  revolution  was  commenced  which  threatened  to  in- 
volve the  Republic  in  numerous  disasters.  Under  the  pretext 
that  the  Chambers  had  by  the  constitution  the  exclusive  right 
of  regulating  the  police  in  the  place  where  it  was  in  session, 
the  Chamber  of  Representatives,  on  the  same  night  of  the  23d, 
authorized  the  assembling  of  all  men  they  could  gather,  well 
armed  and  provided  with  ammunition  and  carefully  selected  from 
the  so-called  order  party  ;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  Governor  of 
Caracas,  on  seeing  so  great  and  so  imminent  a  threat  against 
public  tranquillity,  which  the  law  enjoins  him  to  preserve,  was 
bound  to  call  into  service  a  great  portion  of  the  militia.  Thus 
is  seen  in  what  strange  manner  these  very  conspirators  com- 
pelled the  government  to  place  in  the  hands  of  the  people, 
whom  they  appeared  to  fear,  the  very  arms  by  which  their 
plans  were  to  be  defeated.  More  than  three  thousand  men  in- 
stantly responded  to  the  call  of  the  Governor,  and  that  very 
night  the  conspirators  would  have  received  an  exemplary  pun- 
ishment, but  for  the  great  efforts  made  by  the  authorities  to 
moderate  the  indignation  and  impetuosity  of  the  people.  But 
the  torch  of  discord  was  already  blazing,  already  were  the  men 
of  one  and  the  other  party  resolved  to  come  to  blows  ;  all  had 
reflected,  each  in  his  own  fashion,  upon  the  consequences  of  a 
civil  war,  and  had  determined  to  incur  them  ;  the  one  party 
confiding  in  Paez  and  in  the  moral  importance  which  they 


36 

imagined  they  derived  from  the  Congress  being  in  their  favor  ; 
the  others  confiding  in  the  general  opinion  of  the  people, 
which  is  the  definitive  criterion  in  a  Republic,  and  in  the  just- 
ice of  their  cause.  All  was  prepared  ;  the  opposing  armies 
had  taken  their  respective  positions  ;  the  chiefs,  officers  and 
soldiers  all  fully  understood  the  nature  of  the  question,  the 
cause  they  were  about  to  defend,  and  were  moreover  enthusias- 
tic in  it :  and  with  arms  in  their  hands,  both  -parties  were  only 
anxious  for  the  moment  when  they  should  make  use  of  them. 
The  conspirators,  to  color  their  attempts  with  a  lustre  of  lega- 
lity, pretending  that  thirty-two  excited,  fanatical  and  implicated 
citizens,  some  of  them  deluded  and  confiding  in  Paez,  calling 
themselves  the  representatives  of  the  nation,  had  a  right  to 
suspend  the  President  of  the  Republic.  Ignorant  men  i  Had 
they  not  insolently  presented  themselves  before  the  nation  as 
the  implacable  enemies  of  the  President  ?  How  could  they  pre- 
tend that  the  nation  should  consider  their  decrees  as  those  of 
impartial  judges  ?  They  had  lost  all  prudence,  all  impartiality, 
all  regard  to  justice,  and  they  imagined  that  the  result  of  their 
machinations  would  be  respected  !  Madmen — madmen  ! — not 
to  apostrophize  them  in  severer  terms.  There  was  but  one  thing 
certain  which  they  saw  before  them,  and  that  was  civil  war  ; 
and  they  boasted  of  it,  saying  that  this  was  what  they  were 
seeking,  that  there  was  no  other  remedy,  and  with  that  their 
triumph  was  assured.  Ignorant  and  stupid  men  !  And  why 
were  they  surprised  at  the  event  of  the  24th  of  January  ? 
They  desired  to  launch  the  people  into  civil  war,  and  they  are 
amazed  at  their  picking  up  the  gauntlet  which  they  had  impru- 
dently thrown  down  to  them  !  If  the  24th  of  January  is  to  be 
lamented,  it  was  to  you,  conspirators,  exclusively,  that  it  was 
owing.  These  are  the  fruits  of  your  passions,  of  your  injust- 
ice, of  your  hatred,  of  your  exaggerated  pretensions  to  do- 
minion, of  the  white  sheet  which  you  extended  in  the  public 
press  to  blacken,  revile,  calumniate  public  authority,  and  to 


37 

excite  and  provoke,  by  every  means  in  your  power,  public  ha- 
tred against  it.  This  is  your  work ;  that  which  you  so  ardently 
desired  ;  can  you  be  astonished  at  it  ? 

The  terrible  night  of  the  23d  afforded  no  instruction  to  the 
conspirators,  and  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  met  at  day- 
break on  the  24th,  to  approve  the  provocation  which  some  three 
hundred  men,  whom  they  called  their  guard,  had  given  the 
previous  night.  The  news  of  this  fresh  scandal  had  scarcely  cir- 
culated, when  all  the  citizens  appeared  seized  with  sudden  fury  ; 
some  of  them  were  in  favor  of  the  resolutions  of  the  Chamber — 
others  in  favor  of  the  executive  power  and  their  own  rights  ;  the 
former,  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  latter,  assembled  with 
weapons  of  every  description  they  had  been  able  to  pro- 
cure ;  and  there  were  many  more,  who,  not  having  the 
means  of  procuring  arms,  were  going  about  entreating  to  be 
furnished  with  them,  and  who  meditated  getting  possession  of 
the  park.*  The  aspect  which  the  city  presented  at  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning  was  altogether  frightful,  and  particularly 
to  those  who,  like  ourselves,  had  constantly  reproved  the  idea 
of  an  appeal  to  arms  and  the  exaggerated  views  of  all  parties. 
It  was  evident  that  the  critical  moment  was  closely  approach- 
ing, and  the  only  question  was,  what  would  be  the  occasion 
that  would  bring  it  on.  One  soon  occurred  which  sufficed  to 
bring  about  a  collision,  and  this  was  the  detention  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Representatives  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  who, 
after  having  presented  the  accustomed  message  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic,  was  preparing  to  leave  it  to  present  one 
also  to  the  Senate.  This  was  considered  as  an  arrest  of  the 
secretary,  and  as  the  two  other  secretaries  were  sent  for  at  the 
same  time,  it  was  immediately  rumored  that  they  were  about 
to  get  the  whole  administration  into  the  chamber,  while  they 
voted  the  suspension  of  the  President,  to  prevent  him  having 
any  legal  organ  through  which  to  transmit  his  orders.  This 
was  sufficient ;  some  of  the  people  flew  to  save,  as  they  said, 

*  The  place  in  which  the  government  arms  are  stored. 


38 

the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  and  at  the  moment  that  they 
drew  near  the  door  of  the  edifice,  a  shot  fired  from  a  window- 
situated  above  this  door  killed  citizen  Miguel  Riverol,  an  old 
and  distinguished  Liberal.  The  combat  then  commenced.  A* 
few  minutes  subsequently,  another  Liberal,  Juan  Maldonado, 
was  also  killed,  and  the  exasperation  of  the  people  reached  its 
acme.*  The  guard  of  the  chamber  did  not  disperse  till  they 
had  fired  frequently  ;  however,  many  of  the  conspirators  within 
the  edifice,  who  were  armed,  lost  their  self-possession,  were 
filled  with  terror,  and  fled  by  the  roofs  and  through  the  win- 
dows. They  found  that  they  had  altogether  deceived  them- 
selves ;  the  people  whom  they  had  thought  to  drive  with  whips, 
obliged  them  to  return  to  their  duty  with  musket  balls ;  and 
when  they  were  persuaded  of  the  reality  of  this  fact,  all  their 
valor  at  once,  fortunately  for  themselves,  left  them,  and  their 
only  thought  was,  how  they  could  save  their  lives.  At  that 
moment,  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  presented  scenes 
which  we  will  not  venture  to  describe ;  it  suffices  to  say,  that 
in  it  was  a  depot  of  arms  of  every  sort  similar  to  those  worn  by 
the  conspirators  ;  that  one  of  its  members  and  two  of  the  con- 
spirators, who  were  not  members,  ferociously  threatened  the 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  with  death,  whom  a  few  minutes  af- 
terwards they  supplicated  to  save  them,  and  which  effectively 
he  succeeded  in  doing,  and  others,  in  their  turn,  overcome  with 
fear,  also  sought  in  flight  a  remedy  against  the  effects  of  their  in- 
justice and  their  own  arbitrary  and  unprecedented  proceedings. 
Three  of  the  representatives  were  killed,  and  three  individuals 
engaged  in  the  conspiracy,  by  rushing  out  of  the  building. 

At  that  moment  all  the  authorities  combined,  including  the 
Executive,  were  not,  nor  could  they  be,  sufficiently  powerful  to 
stay  the  popular  action,  which  brooked  no  control,  although  they 

*  They  then  rushed  to  the  park,  a  distance  of  only  a  few  squares,  broke 
open  the  doors,  armed  themselves,  and  hastened  to  the  assistance  of  their 
fellow  citizens,  who  were  endeavoring  to  save  the  Minister  of  the  Interior, 


39 

had  only  to  oppose  with  efficacy  the  proceedings  of  some  few 
men  who  pretended  to  arrogate  to  themselves  the  supreme 
power  The  people  of  the  capital  had  patiently  looked  on  while 
the  conspiracy  was  being  plotted  even  before  their  eyes,  be- 
cause they  confided  in  the  impartiality  and  prudence  of  the 
Chamber  of  Representatives,  but  from  the  moment  they  were 
convinced  that  two-thirds  of  the  members  present  were  resolv- 
ed on  making  an  abuse  of  their  legal  power,  and  from  being  re- 
presentatives of  the  nation  had  converted  themselves  into  mere 
instruments  of  an  ambitious  man  and  his  miserable  party,  and 
comprehending  the  feelings  of  all  the  people  of  Venezuela,  which 
were  well  known  to  them,  they  declared  ia  the  face  of  the  whole 
world  that  these  representatives  had  transformed  themselves 
into  a  handful  of  conspirators,  and  defied  them  to  prove  the  con- 
trary by  appealing  to  the  nation. 

We  have  recorded  these  facts  after  a  careful  examination, 
in  the  manner  we  believe  that  they  occurred,  and  have  concealed 
nothing :  a  very  small  portion  of  the  militia  composed  a  part  of 
the  throng  of  people  who  hastened  to  liberate  the  Secretary  of 
the  Interior ;  the  greater  number  were  not  armed  militia,  they 
were  the  people  armed  with  all  sorts  of  weapons,  and  also  with 
muskets  taken  from  the  depot  which  had  been  forced  by  them, 
in  spite  of  the  authorities,  and  for  the  reason  that  these  same  au- 
thorities had  not  the  power  to  prevent  them  ;  because  the  mili- 
tia was  the  force  which  had  charge  of  the  depot, — because  it 
was  the  force  in  which  the  government  had  confidence — the 
force  which  the  conspirators  could  in  no  way  bribe  nor  gain 
over  to  their  party, — and  this  militia  was  the  people  with  its 
ideas  and  connections  and  its  enthusiasm  in  favor  of  the  govern- 
ment and  against  the  conspirators,  so  that  it  was  impossible  that 
the  government  could  have  thought  of  confiding  the  arms  of  the 
nation  to  other  hands. 

The  conspirators  and  those  who  thought  and  desired  as  they 
did,  have,  in  consequence  of  these  very  acts,  brought  charg.es 
against  the  government  without  reflecting  that  there  never  yet 


40 

has  been  a  government  which  has  committed  knowingly  a  sui- 
cidal act,  that  it  was  but  too  apparent  that  the  conspirators  in- 
tended to  depose  the  President,  and  plunge  the  country  into  a 
deadly  civil  war,  and  that  the  latter  having  an  intimate  convic- 
tion of  such  a  conspiracy,  was  bound  in  the  most  imperious 
imaginable  manner  to  prevent  the  conspirators  from  carrying 
their  project  into  effect ;  he,  therefore,  from  precautionary  mo- 
tives called  out  a  portion  of  the  people,  and  the  conspirators  who 
thought  of  driving  them  with  whips,  and  who  eagerly  sought  the 
shock  of  parties  and  a  civil  war,  despised  the  armed  people  and 
provoked  them  to  the  combat,  calculating  that  they  were 
either  imbecile  or  cowardly  ;  they  had  deluded  themselves  on 
every  point,  and  then  became  furious  against  the  President, 
who  they  imagined  ought  to  have  allowed  them  to  do  all  they 
would  without  attempting  by  any  means  in  his  power,  to  save 
society  from  the  excesses  which  they  meditated  ;  and  they  dare 
now  to  attribute  to  the  President  the  event  of  the  24th. 

Unfortunate  would  it  have  been  for  the  conspirators  and  their 
accomplices  in  the  chamber  of  deputies  if  they  had  been  able  to 
effect  even  the  suspension  of  the  president !  A  thousand  thanks 
to  the  people  who  prevented  them  from  precipitating  themselves 
into  the  abyss  !  what  would  have  been  their  fate  ?  what  would 
have  been  the  fate  of  the  country  ?  For  ourselves,  we  utterly 
despise  calumny,  and  we  trust  that  impartial  men  who  read 
this  production  will  acknowledge  that  the  things  happened  pre- 
cisely as  it  was  natural  they  should  happen  ;  that  taking  in  view 
the  antecedents  of  which  we  have  spoken,  the  consequences 
went  on  following  each  other  in  a  logical  and  necessary  man- 
ner: that  the  President  took  no  other  part  in  the  event  of  the 
24th,  than  that  which  he  was  bound  to  take  ;  glorious  it  was, 
highly  glorious,  for  not  having  been  willing  to  give  Paez  the 
satisfaction  of  submitting  to  his  will,  subjecting  to  it  as  he 
desired,  the  independence  of  the  Executive  power  in  exchange 
for  the  influence  he  exercised  in  the  presidential  election  ;  and 
glorious  also  because  he  had  adopted  efficacious  means  to  pre- 


41 

vent  Paez  from  deceiving  the  nation.  What  necessity  was 
there  for  the  President  to  excite  the  people  to  attack  the  cham- 
ber of  representatives,  when  the  people  were  of  themselves  so 
much  excited  that  it  was  impossible  to  make  them  retrocede  ? 
The  President,  it  is  true,  did  intervene  in  the  affair  of  the  24th 
of  January  ;  but  it  was  to  moderate  the  impetuosity  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  personally  to  save  and  to  induce  others  to  save  many 
of  the  conspirators  ;  these  are  the  orders  which  the  President 
gave ;  nor  could  he  give  others,  for  they  were  not  necessary, 
unless  indeed  that  the  conspirators  pretend  he  should  have  or- 
dered the  people  to  fire  upon  the  people  to  restrain  them. 

Ungrateful  men  !  his  most  gratuitous  and  atrocious  enemies 
owed  their  lives  to  him  upon  that  day,  and  they  employed  the 
following  one  in  attributing  to  him  the  fury  of  the  people,  of 
which  they  alone  were  the  first  cause.  Was  it  not  seen  how 
eagerly  they  rushed  forward  by  tens  of  thousands  to  take  up 
arms  solely  because  it  was  against  Paez  and  his  party,  for  had 
the  government  been  authorized  to  do  so  and  had  muskets 
enough,  it  might  have  placed  fifty  thousand  men  under  arms  in 
thirty  days  ?  WTas  it  not  seen  with  what  satisfaction  thousands 
of  men  crossed  the  country  in  every  direction,  supporting  with 
admirable  patience,  hunger,  want  of  clothing,  the  rigors  of  the 
rainy  season,  and  all  descriptions  of  suffering  ?  Did  the  con- 
spirators calculate  that  the  magic  name  of  Paez  would  serve 
against  our  institutions  as  it  had  done  in  their  favor  ?  Did  they 
confound  the  goodness  of  the  people  with  that  which  they  un- 
reflectingly called  their  imbecility  :  Were  they  ignorant  that 
the  power  of  opinion,  when  it  is  so  uniform  and  enthusiastic 
as  it  was  throughout  Venezuela  in  favor  of  the  institutions 
and  the  Monagas  administration  which  sustains  them,  supplies 
the  place  of  thousands  of  dollars  and  thousands  of  elevated 
intellects  ?  Did  they  imagine  that  an  assembly  of  thirty-two 
men  could  be  called  a  Chamber  of  Representatives,  when  they 
did  not  really  represent  their  constituents,  but  merely  a  millesi- 
mal portion  of  society  which  had  conspired  against  the  great  bulk 


42 

of  the  nation  ;  and  finally,  was  it  that  they  were  so  headstrong, 
so  blind,  so  obstinately  bent  on  a  conspiracy  that  they  stood  in 
need  of  such  a  chastisement  as  they  received  on  the  24th,  and 
such  a  reproof  as  that  they  have  undergone  since  the  public 
and  barefaced  rising  of  Paez  ? 

Within  a  few  days  it  will  appear,  SANCTIONED  BY  HISTORY, 
that  the  Venezuelan  nation  had  seen  with  profound  grief,  but 
at  the  same  time  with  horror  and  indignation,  the  public  plots 
which  a  small  number  of  conspirators  were  contriving,  whereby 
to  give  a  color  of  legality  to  the  most  manifest  usurpation  and 
most  abominable  pretensions.  That  the  nation  being  placed 
by  the  furious  will  of  those  it  had  elected  to  be  its  delegates 
within  the  august  precincts  of  the  legislative  chambers,  in  the 
dreadful  alternative  either  of  sanctioning  the  degradation  and 
assassination  of  their  President  or  the  death  of  these  same 
traitorous  delegates,  decided  on  adopting  this  last  extreme 
measure,  for  so  it  has  been  asserted  by  Paez  and  his  partisans  ; 
they  have  inundated  the  Republic  with  emissaries,  with  letters 
from  Paez  and  from  private  individuals,  and  pamphlets  containing 
addresses  and  letters  from  Paez  to  the  President,  and  decla- 
rations from  Chaguaramas  and  Maracaibo.  That  Paez  and 
his  party  did  not  calculate  on  any  support  from  public  opinion, 
and  consequently  had  no  other  reason  for  their  exaggerated 
pretensions  to  domination,  than  because  they  were  occu- 
pying certain  official  stations  which  they  were  determined  to 
abuse  in  order  to  maintain  themselves  in  power  in  contradiction 
to  the  will  of  the  people.  That  Paez,  disregarding  the  great 
duties  he  owed  to  the  country,  considered  only  how  he  could 
insure  his  own  power,  and  has  been  the  principal  author 
of  all  the  evils  which  the  Republic  is  now  suffering  un- 
der. That  by  such  reckless  and  criminal  conduct  he  has 
entirely  forfeited  all  the  merit  he  had  acquired  by  his  former 
good  services,  has  blackened  and  defaced  his  glory,  has  entailed 
upon  himself  a  reproach  which  will  adhere  to  his  name  through 
all  posterity.  And  finally,  that  henceforward  no  personal 
power  can  ever  be  substituted  in  Venezuela  for  the  will  of 


43 

the  majority  of  the  people,  for  the  empire  of  the  Constitu- 
tion and  the  Laws.  Fallen  is  the  Colossus,  and  the  devasta- 
tion which  he  has  spread  wherever  he  has  passed,  and  the 
innumerable  evils  he  has  inflicted  on  his  country,  besides  ac- 
companying him  forever  as  a  terrible  reproach,  will  serve  as 
a  constant  and  eloquent  lesson  to  the  people  never  again  to 
raise  another  personal  power  in  Venezuela. 

Ambitious  men  like  Paez  are  the  real  cause  of  great  evils 
and  of  the  ruin  of  their  country ;  while  virtuous  and  moderate 
men  like  Washington  are  the  founders  of  great  nations. 

From  the  year  1848,  the  people  of  Venezuela  will  be  the 
true  arbiters  of  their  own  destiny.  They  will  have  a  thousand 
difficulties  to  surmount,  whether  it  be  to  repair  the  effects  of 
the  domination  of  Paez,  or  to  prepare  and  open  to  themselves 
the  road  to  wealth  and  happiness.  But  they  will  never 
attain  these  ends  excepting  by  dint  of  virtues,  and  especially 
those  of  industry,  tolerance  and  moderation. 


WE  copy  from  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  New  York 
Tribune  of  the  15th  of  November  last,  a  sketch  of  the  events 
which  occurred  after  the  24th  of  January,  1848,  although  it  is 
deficient  in  many  details  which  cannot  now  be  given  from  not 
having  the  whole  of  the  official  documents  before  us.  We,  hav- 
ing been  eye-witnesses  of  them,  can,  however,  vouch  for  its 
being  an  accurate  account  of  the  events  mentioned  in  it ;  and  it 
is,  at  the  same  time,  sufficient  to  give  a  clear  view  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which  led  to  the  banishment  of  General  Paez  and 
some  of  his  followers,  from  the  territory  of  Venezuela. 
•  "  On  the  26th  of  January,  the  Chambers  again  assembled,  not 


44 

as  we  have  reason  to  believe,  because  the  Senators  and  Repre- 
sentatives were  compelled  to  meet  by  force,  but  because  they 
were  convinced  that  Congress  ought  to  continue  its  sittings,  in 
the  first  place,  to  pass  a  measure  of  clemency  which  should 
exonerate  its  own  members  who  had  participated  in  the  boot- 
less conspiracy,  and  to  determine  on  other  measures  demanded 
by  the  actual  state  of  circumstances.  It  is  true  that  in  a  few 
days  afterward  the  Sessions  were  suspended,  because  these 
very  conspirators,  believing  themselves  to  be  already  perfectly 
safe,  thought  to  favor  the  cause  of  Paez,  which  was  their  own, 
by  the  dissolution  of  the  legislative  body.  But  their  project  was 
frustrated,  and  after  an  interval  of  some  days  the  Congress  re- 
sumed its  labors,  calling  in  the  supplementary  members  in  place 
of  those  who  had  abandoned  the  country.  When  some  of  the 
latter  protested  from  Curagoa  against  the  violence  which  they 
asserted  had  been  employed  in  order  to  compel  them  to  assem- 
ble on  the  25th,  they  were  contradicted  by  some  of  their  own 
companions,  who  stated  that  they  had  attended  the  Chamber  of 
Representatives  freely  and  spontaneously.  This  was  also 
proved  by  numbers  of  other  persons  who  had  seen  them  go  to 
the  Chamber  without  any  species  of  compulsion  being  used 
towards  them.* 

*Mr.  Acevedo  says  in  his  answer  to  the  Revisar  on  the  subject :  "  We  can- 
not but  honor  many  of  these  representatives  for  the  considerations  which  we 
afterwards  heard  them  declare  had  principally  influenced  their  minds.  They 
were  as  follows :  Firstly :  they  confessed  that  a  turn  had,  undoubtedly, 
been  given  by  their  party  to  political  affairs  which  could  only  lead  to  a  civil 
war,  and  they  lamented  having  been  the  victims  of  such  a  tendency,  which 
in  no  case,  in  no  country,  in  no  age,  has  been  productive  of  order,  of  civiliza- 
tion, or  improvement,  and  much  less  could  it  be  conducive  to  the  assuring  of 
a  republican  political  system  on  a  solid  basis  ;  and  from  this  they  deduced  the 
necessity  of  avoiding  the  evils  of  such  a  war  by  not  giving  their  concurrence 
to  the  Congress.  Secondly :  they  also  confessed  that  they  desired  to  save 
Paez,  who  was  compromised  with  them,  and  they  hoped  on  seeing  their  new 
line  of  conduct  that  he  would  have  changed  his  course.  Paez  was  guided 
more  by  the  strength  of  the  position  in  which  he  had  placed  himself,  and 
the  instincts  of  his  own  ambition,  than  by  the  suggestions  of  patriotism,  and 


45 

We  say  then,  that  this  affair  of  January  24th  grew  primarily 
out  of  the  conspiracy  of  the  Paez  party  to  overthrow  the  Pres- 
ident whom  they  could  not  make  recreant  to  his  duty.  The 
people  of  Caracas  hated  that  party  as  much  as  they  had  become 
attached  to  the  President,  and  accordingly  rose  in  spontaneous 
opposition  to  their  outrageous  intentions.  It  is  said  that  Mon- 
agas  or  his  friends  stirred  them  up  and  set  them  on  to  murder 
the  opposition  Members  of  Congress.  Now  in  the  entire 
melee  only  three  Representatives  were  shot ;  one  of  them, 
Senor  Salas  of  Maracaibo,  was  a  friend  of  the  President,  and 
had  voted  steadily  in  his  favor ;  he  was  killed  near  the  outer 
door ;  but  had  the  attack  been  designed  and  executed  under 
the  direction  of  Monagas,  he  certainly  would  have  taken  care 
that  his  adherents  should  not  perish  in  it. 

The  other  representatives  killed  in  the  firing  were  Garcia  and 
Argote,  the  latter  a  colored  barber  of  Caracas,  and  a  blind  instru- 
ment of  the  Oligarchy.  That  party  was  in  the  habit  of  nominat- 
ing illiterate  men  of  the  laboring  class  on  its  ticket  in  order  to 
strengthen  itself  at  the  ballot  box.  If  this  man  were  not  killed 
by  mere  accident,  which  we  have  no  doubt  was  the  case,  he 
must  have  perished  from  the  indignation  the  people  felt  toward 
him  personally,  for  having  betrayed  their  cause. 

One  more  Representative  only  fell  a  victim  on  this  occasion, 
and  he  was  universally  regretted.  We  mean  Senor  Santos 

this  it  was  which  caused  his  fall.  Thirdly :  they  clearly  saw  that  the  disso- 
lution of  Congress  might  augment  the  moral  power  of  Paez ;  but  they  also 
knew  that  the  popular  action  against  them  and  their  party  would  be  increased 
tenfold,  and  that  the  results,  besides  being  fatal  to  themselves,  would  be  so,  in 
a  great  measure,  to  the  country,  and  they  thought  it  their  duty  to  avoid  them 
as  far  as  in  their  power.  Finally  :  the  minds  of  many  of  them  were  im- 
bued with  a  sense  of  gratitude  towards  the  President,  who  had  saved  them 
and  their  companions  in  the  terrible  day  of  the  24th,  and  they  cast  far  from 
them  the  idea,  after  that  event,  of  entertaining  feelings  of  revenge  against  a 
man,  who,  by  his  conduct  in  that  conflict,  and  by  the  love  which  the  people 
manifested  for  him,  was  the  sole  guarantee  for  their  lives,  and  those  of  their 
families,  as  he  was  also  of  those  of  all  the  oligarchists  in  the  Republic, 


46 

Michelena.  On  the  first  alarm  he  jumped  from  one  of  the 
windows  of  the  Representatives'  Chamber,  and  was  badly 
hurt  by  the  fall.  Just  as  he  struck  the  ground  a  party  of  citi- 
zens charged  down  the  street  with  fixed  bayonets,  and  one  of 
them  wounded  him,  though  had  they  recognized  him,  the  uni- 
versal esteem  in  which  he  was  held  would  have  saved  him 
from  any  injury.  He  died  a  few  days  afterward,  whether  from 
the  wound  or  the  fall  is  a  disputed  point  in  Venezuela,  which 
seems  to  us  of  little  consequence. 

Moreover,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  President's  sons 
were  in  the  building,  as  was  Sanavria,  the  Minister  of  the  Inte- 
rior, and  several  others  of  Monagas's  best  friends.  They  were 
there  with  no  protection  from  the  pistols  and  poniards  with 
which  the  hostile  representatives  were  known  to  be  armed. 
With  these  weapons,  as  we  are  assured  by  credible  persons 
who  were  eye-witnesses  of  the  scene  in  the  Chamber,  Sanavria 
was  actually  threatened,  and  had  there  been  any  reason  at  the 
time  to  suppose  that  the  attack  without  proceeded  from  the 
President,  the  lives  of  these  persons  would  undoubtedly  have 
been  taken  as  an  act  of  desperate  vengeance.  Besides,  they 
were  in  equal  danger  with  the  others  from  the  mob,  as  is 
proved  by  what  happened  to  Salas  and  Michelena.  In  the  ex- 
citement and  exasperation  of  the  moment  the  mass  of  people 
could  not  distinguish  between  friends  and  foes,  and  had  the 
firing  been  continued  and  the  contest  carried  into  the  building, 
few  of  its  occupants  could  have  escaped.  Now  it  is  not  cred- 
ible that  Monagas  would  have  exposed  so  many  of  his  friends 
to  danger  of  such  a  nature.  The  man  who  would  not  consent 
to  the  execution  of  persons  legally  accused,  but  unjustly 
condemned,  would  hardly  let  loose  such  bloody  destruction 
upon  the  heads  of  his  children,  his  political  and  personal  ad- 
herents, and  his  enemies  altogether.  The  supposition  is  too 
absurd  for  any  mind  not  heated  and  distorted  by  party  spirit. 

One  thing  more  in  this  connection  :  Gen.  Paez  states  that 
Monagas,  in  a  circular  dated  Jan.  22,  speaks  of  the  event  of  the 


47 

day  previous  as  "a  scandalous  and  lamentable  crime."  We 
have  before  us  the  Gaceta  de  Venezuela  containing  that  circu- 
lar ;  the  words  in  it  are  un  suceso  lamentable  y  escandaloso,  a 
scandalous  and  lamentable  event.  And  this  refers  to  the  attack 
caused  by  the  firing  of  the  guards.  This  remarkable  fault  in 
translation  does  not  speak  well  for  thejntegrity  of  the  Defence 
in  general. 

Another  decisive  evidence  that  there  was  a  conspiracy 
against  the  Government  and  Constitution,  is  found  in  the  dec- 
laration of  Senor  J.  V.  Gonzales,  editor  of  La  Prensa,  a  repre- 
sentative and  one  of  the  chief  plotters.  He  was  taken  into  the 
presence  of  the  President  by  the  friends  of  the  latter,  who  had 
saved  him  from  the  fury  of  the  people.  He  confessed  that  the 
conspiracy  had  been  planned  for  many  months,  in  the  first  place 
for  the  purpose  of  intimidating  Monagas  and  inducing  him  to 
resign  the  presidency,  and  afterwards  with  the  object  of  carry- 
ing out  the  threats  they  had  made.  He  also  said  that  they  all 
counted  on  the  cooperation  of  Paez,  who  had  engaged  to  be 
their  chief. — But  it  is  time  to  look  a  little  at  the  personal 
movements  of  that  gentleman. 

Some  months  previous  to  Jan.  24th  he  had  been  offered  by  the 
government  an  important  mission  to  Europe  and  had  declined 
it.  As  the  epoch  approached  for  the  conspiracy  to  come  to  a 
head,  he  asked  and  obtained  leave  of  absence  on  the  pretence 
of  going  to  New  Granada.  The  elements  of  the  plot  all  being 
duly  organized,  and  the  support  of  Congress  being,  as  the  Oli- 
garchists  supposed,  insured,  he  set  out  in  the  direction  of  New 
Granada,  but  evidently  with  no  design  of  going  there.  The 
following  facts  are  conclusive  on  this  point.  He  left  Maracai 
on  the  3d  of  January,  1848,  and  went  to  the  plains,  in  order, 
as  he  gave  out,  to  visit  a  cattle  farm  of  his  called  San  Pablo, 
which  required  his  personal  inspection.  There  he  already  had 
assembled  his  horses,  his  guards,  and  a  number  of  his  partisans. 
Travelling  slowly,  as  is  usual  in  that  country,  he  had  time  to  con- 


48 

fer  with  the  most  prominent  persons  in  Calabozo,  the  capital  of 
the  plains.  With  them  we  have  ample  reason  to  believe  he 
negotiated  for  aid  in  the  rising  soon  to  take  place  against  the 
government.  And  why  should  he  take  to  New  Granada  a  route 
leading  through  dense  forests,  and  an  uninhabited  country 
where  difficulty  and  privations  of  every  sort  must  be  met  on  the 
way,  when  he  might  have  reached  Maracaibo  by  sea  in  an  easy 
voyage  of  three  or  four  days,  and  thence  have  gone,  without 
any  inconvenience,  to  San  Jose  de  Cticuta  ?  It  would  seem  as 
if  there  were  only  one  reason,  namely,  the  conspiracy.  Ap- 
parently his  purpose  was  to  remain  in  the  plains,  where  he 
already  hjfl  some  preparations  made,  where  he  could  find 
among  the  inhabitants  the  most  serviceable  soldiers  in  Vene- 
zuela, and  whence  he  could  best  strike  an  unexpected  blow  in 
any  direction. 

For  some  time  Paez  remained  at  San  Pablo,  with  a  consider- 
able number  of  followers,  waiting  the  news  that  Monagas  had 
fallen,  so  that  he  might  return  in  triumph  to  Caracas.  But  in- 
stead of  this  he  learned  that  the  plot  had  signally  failed.  Now 
but  one  resource  remained ;  he  had  conspired  to  overthrow  the 
government  through  the  Congress  ;  now  he  could  only  hope  to 
overthrow  it  by  open  rebellion.  Intrigue  and  hidden  treason 
had  lost  their  potency.  He  at  once  unfurled  the  standard  of 
revolt.  His  head-quarters  were  at  a  place  named  El  Rastro. 
He  succeeded  in  inducing  the  population  of  Calabozo,  Orituco, 
and  other  portions  of  the  neighborhood,  where  he  had  partisans, 
to  revolt  also. 

At  the  same  time  some  of  the  conspirators  who  after  the 
24th  January  had  left  Caracas  for  Maracaibo,  deceived  the  in- 
habitants of  that  city  by  false  accounts  of  the  events  which  had 
taken  place,  and  as,  unfortunately,  Senor  Salas,  the  representa- 
tive of  that  province,  had  fallen  on  that  day,  they  managed  to 
excite  the  minds  of  the  inhabitants  against  the  government,  to 
which  they  attributed  all  the  evils  which  had  occurred.  Ma- 


49 

racaibo  having  declared  itself,  they  induced  the  provinces  of 
Merida  and  Truxillo  to  imitate  its  example. 

They  also  contrived  to  cause  the  rising  of  some  districts  in 
the  province  of  Cuman&.  Paez  had  presented  himself  to  the 
Republic  as  the  restorer  of  the  constitution  and  the  laws,  which, 
he  said,  had  been  destroyed  by  the  President.  He  employed 
every  means  within  his  own  reach  or  that  of  his  partisans,  to 
induce  the  people  to  follow  him,  but  in  vain.  He  succeeded  in 
deceiving  only  those  portions  of  the  country  above  indicated, 
while  all  the  remainder  rose  in  one  mass  to  sustain  the  govern- 
ment and  defend  the  institutions  of  the  country.  And  they 
rose  so  spontaneously  and  with  such  enthusiasm  that  had  the 
Executive  desired  it,  it  could  have  placed  50,000  men  under 
arms. 

Paez,  seeing  the  inutility  of  his  efforts  to  unite  sufficient 
forces  in  Calaboza,  and  those  of  the  government  having  ad- 
vanced toward  that  city,  withdrew  into  the  province  of  Apure, 
with  the  idea  of  seducing  Gen.  Cornelio  Munoz  from  his  alle- 
giance ;  but  that  loyal  veteran  of  the  War  of  Independence,  in- 
stead of  listening  to  his  perfidious  insinuations,  marched  upon 
him,  although  with  an  inferior  force,  and  meeting  him  in  the 
savannas  of  the  Araguatos  attacked  and  completely  routed 
him,  Paez  flying  until  he  reached  the  territory  of  New  Granada. 
(See  Appendix  A.) 

It  will  be  remembered  by  those  who  have  paid  attention  to 
these  details,  that  the  Paez  party  for  a  long  time  held  the 
castle  of  San  Carlos,  in  the  lake  of  Maracaibo,  and  that  they 
besieged  the  town  of  that  name,  which  was  defended  by  Gen. 
Castelli  for  several  months.  The  government  at  that  period 
had  not  a  marine  force  of  sufficient  strength  to  force  the  bar  of 
Maracaibo,  the  Paez  party  having  several  vessels  to  defend  the 
entrance.  At  length  the  government  mustered  a  few  sailing 
vessels,  which,  together  with  the  steamer  Libertador,  entered 
the  bay,  and  on  the  13th  December,  1848,  came  to  action  with 
4 


60 

the  Paez  fleet,  defeated  them,  raised  the  siege  of  Maracaibo, 
took  possession  of  the  castle  of  San  Carlos,  which  the  Paez 
party  had  abandoned,  and  then  pursued  the  fugitives  into  the 
river  Zulia.  There  they  took  the  remainder  of  their  ships, 
together  with  the  steamer  General  Jackson,  then  called  the 
Buena  Vista,  on  board  which  they  took  seventy  prisoners,  mostly 
officers.  At  the  same  time  they  routed  the  land  forces,  which 
had  taken  possession  of  the  small  town  of  San  Carlos,  and  sent 
the  prisoners  to  Puerto  Cabello.  As  an  illustration  of  the 
bloodthirstiness  of  the  President  of  the  Republic,  and  his 
tyrannical  severity,  we  may  mention  that  these  prisoners  were 
released  and  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  on  giving  their 
parole  that  they  would  not  again  serve  against  the  government 
of  the  Republic.  Among  them  were  two  of  Gen.  Paez's  sons  ! 
The  General  himself  was  during  the  whole  of  this  time  at  Cu- 
ra9oa,  with  his  friend  Quintero,  quietly  watching  the  course  of 
events. 

On  the  21st  of  June  an  attempt  was  made  to  assassinate  the 
President.  A  party  of  men,  instigated  by  and  belonging  to  the 
Oligarchical  party,  came  from  Chaguaramas,  rode  up,  favored  by 
the  darkness  of  the  night,  to  the  President's  residence,  and  at- 
tacked the  guard,  attempting  to  force  their  way  into  the  house, 
crying  "  Muera  Monagas  /"  Fortunately,  at  the  very  onset 
the  horse  of  the  leader  of  this  party,  Belisario,  was  shot  down, 
and  the  confusion  occasioned  by  this  gave  the  guards  time  to 
rally  to  the  defence  of  their  general.  The  assassins  were  in- 
stantly repulsed  and  took  to  flight.  On  the  22d  the  towns  of 
Guarenas,  Santa  Lucia,  Calabozo,  with  others  of  minor  import- 
ance, took  up  arms  against  the  government,  imagining  that  the 
President  had  fallen  a  victim  to  this  treacherous  plot,  and  show- 
ing clearly  that  the  whole  affair  had  been  regularly  combined 
and  organized.  Had  any  one  in  Venezuela  before  doubted  the 
popularity  of  Monagas,  he  would  at  once  have  been  undeceived, 
for  the  whole  population  of  Caracas  spontaneously  rushed  to 


51 

his  defence.  Addresses  of  congratulation  from  all  the  provinces 
were  also  sent  to  the  government  house. 

In  the  month  of  July,  1849,  Paez  resolved  on  again  trying 
his  fortune  on  the  soil  of  Venezuela.  He  landed  at  Coro, 
where  his  adherents  raised  about  1,200  men,  surprised  the 
authorities  and  took  the  town,  and  then  advanced  into  the  in- 
terior of  the  country,  spreading  desolation  wherever  he  passed. 
The  country  people  fled  at  his  approach,  till  at  last  they  as- 
sembled in  numbers,  arming  themselves  as  they  could,  and 
together  with  the  militia  surrounded  him  in  a  place  called 
Campo  Monagas,  where,  finding  his  position  desperate,  he  sur- 
rendered at  discretion,  throwing  himself  upon  the  clemency  of 
the  government.*  Paez  was  taken  to  Caracas,  where  the  Presi- 
dent, with  the  consent  of  the  Council  of  Government — the 
Congress  not  being  then  in  session — instead  of  handing  him 
over  to  the  regular  tribunals  to  be  tried  for  treason,  granted  him 
an  amnesty  ;  but  for  the  security  and  tranquillity  of  the  Repub- 
lic, exiled  him  from  its  territory.  In  the  mean  time  addresses 
poured  in  from  the  provinces  urging  the  government  to  allow 
Paez  to  be  tried  by  the  common  tribunals — not  as  a  conspira- 
tor merely,  but  for  the  excesses,  murders,  incendiarisms,  and 
rapine  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  him  and  his  follow- 
ers during  his  last  expedition.  The  President  fearing  some 
outbreak  of  the  people,  who,  stirred  up  by  all  these  addresses, 
might  have  been  led  into  some  excesses  fatal  to  Paez,  had  him 
removed  from  Caracas  to  the  castle  of  San  Antonio  in  Cumana, 
where  he  remained  until  the  Congress  of  the  Republic  passed 
a  decree  banishing  him  for  ever  from  the  territory  of  Venezuela. 
He  proceeded  to  the  island  of  St.  Thomas,  and  thence  found 
his  way  to  New  York  by  way  of  Philadelphia. 

Among  the  officers  who  surrendered  at  Campo  Monagas  were 
many  of  those  who  had  been  taken  at  San  Carlos  de  Zulia,  and 
liberated  on  their  parole.  In  most  countries  such  a  breach  of 

*  See  Appendix  B 


52 

faith  would  have  been  punished  with  death;  but  Monagas, 
true  to  the  principles  which  he  had  adopted  on  assuming  the 
reins  of  government,  merely  exiled  the  most  prominent  among 
them.  During  the  whole  of  his  presidency  there  has  not  been 
a  single  execution  throughout  Venezuela  for  political  offences. 
The  two  following  papers  are  extracted  from  an  answer 
written  by  Mr.  Acevedo  in  1849,,  to  some  observations  which 
had  appeared  in  a  paper  called  "  El  Revisor*"  in  Curacoa. 
They  will  be  read  with  interest,  as  they  give  a  succinct  review 
of  the  career  of  both  Generals  Monagas  and  Paez.  From  them 
the  people  of  the  United  States  will  be  able  to  form  an  opinion 
of  the  character  of  the  two  men  who  have  been  so  prominent 
in  the  affairs  of  Venezuela. 


MONAGAS. 

HOWEVER  little  the  editor  of  the  Revisor  may  know  of  the 
revolution  which  secured  the  independence  of  Venezuela,  he 
ought  to  know  in  what  manner,  and  by  what  honorable  and 
imperishable  titles,  the  name  of  General  Jose  Tadeo  Monagas 
has  been  inscribed  in  the  annals  of  our  country.  His  life  con- 
sidered in  every  point  of  view  up  to  the  year  1831,  is  shielded 
from  every  species  of  attack  :  immaculate  patriotism,  approved 
valor,  firm  and  intrepid  character,  unshakable  morality,  and 
important  services  not  only  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and  indepen- 
dence, but  to  that  of  order  ;  such  are  the  principal  features  in  his 
biography  to  that  period,  and  for  these  he  deserved  to  be  gra- 
dually elevated  to  the  highest  rank  which  he  obtained  in  the 
militia.  From  that  time  until  1847,  he  held  no  public  office, 
but  lived  in  retirement,  giving  examples  of  morality,  laborious- 
ness  and  probity.  In  1831,  he  for  a  few  months  was  at  the 
head  of  an  insurrection,  and  in  1835  of  another.  Paez  also  ac- 


53 

cuses  him  of  treason  in  the  exercise  of  his  presidential  powers. 
I  will  take  a  rapid  survey  of  these  charges,  in  order  to  enter 
duly  into  the  discussion. 

It  is  known  that  there  existed  a  Republic  of  Colombia,  which 
in  1829  was  presided  over  by  the  Liberator,  Simon  Bolivar, 
that  Venezuela  commenced  a  revolution  headed  by  Paez,  to- 
ward the  end  of  that  year  and  the  beginning  of  1830,  to  dis- 
acknowledge  the  Liberator,  and  separate  herself  from  Colombia, 
and  that  at  the  end  of  the  latter  year  was  promulgated  the  con- 
stitution, which  was  the  product  of  that  revolution.  A  revo- 
lution and  a  constitution  are  not  slight  matters,  and  men  like 
General  Monagas,  who  had  labored  to  found  themselves  a  coun- 
try, who  were  really  grateful  to  Bolivar,  who  had  sworn  to 
support  Colombia,  and  who  were  enchanted  with  her,  are  in  no 
way  culpable,  because  they  could  not  at  once  cast  from  them  all 
these  noble  feelings.  Venezuela  was  alarmed  at  the  idea  of 
the  establishment  of  a  monarchy,  and  tore  asunder  the  great 
Republic,  the  constituent  Assembly  consummating  the  work, 
by  banishing  Bolivar.  Many  men  recovered  from  this  first 
stupor.  Bolivar  caused  his  voice  to  be  heard  throughout  Vene- 
zuela, and  half  the  country  repented  of  their  levity  and  the 
measures  which  had  been  taken,  and  thought  of  once  more 
submitting  to  Bolivar.  General  Monagas  refused  to  take  the 
oaths  to  the  new  constitution,  and  placed  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  party  who  opposed  it.  Was  not  such  conduct  highly 
noble  and  praiseworthy  ?  Had  not  Bolivar  died,  the  constitu- 
tion of  Venezuela  would  indubitably  have  ceased  to  exist,  for 
the  reaction  was  tremendous ;  but  he  expired  while  it  was  be- 
ing organized,  and  as  soon  as  General  Monagas  was  convinced 
of  the  truth  of  this  fact,  he  believed  that  the  re-organization  of 
Colombia  was  impossible,  and  thought  only  of  the  means  by 
which  he  could  honorably  Avithdraw  from  so  critical  a  position. 
The  Revisor  says  that  Paez  conquered  him,  but  I  cannot  com- 
prehend how  there  could  be  a  conquest  where  there  was  no 
struggle,  combat,  battle,  contention,  skirmish,  nor  anything  of 


54 

that  nature.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  proved  that  many  of  the 
military  men  who  had  accompanied  him,  were  of  the  same  opin- 
ion with  himself,  because  they  submitted  in  the  Valley  of  La 
Pascua  without  a  combat,  and  one  of  them  was  the  valiant  An- 
tonio Belisario,  whom  Paez  has  just  caused  to  be  killed,  so 
wickedly  in  Maracaibo,  and  this  Belisario  with  all  the  cantons 
of  Chaguaramas  were  then  following  General  Monagas.  The 
latter,  who  had  entertained  no  personal  or  anti-patriotic  views  in 
the  movement  he  had  made,  and  who  was  convinced  he  could 
no  longer  effect  the  good  to  which  he  had  aspired,  would  not 
allow  Venezuelan  blood  to  be  shed  on  his  account,  and  obliged 
all  his  companions  in  arms  to  submit.  Paez  pardoned  him  be- 
cause he  could  not,  nor  ought  not  to  have  acted  otherwise,  and 
Monagas  and  all  the  Republic  were  convinced  of  this.  What 
then  was  condemnable  or  reproachable  in  the  conduct  of  Gene- 
ral Monagas  in  all  this  matter  ? 

And  now  to  1835.  It  was  not  General  Monagas  who  caused 
the  insurrection  of  that  year,  and  it  is  proved  that  he  adopted 
it  as  the  only  means  of  saving  the  Republic,  which  he  believed 
would  otherwise  be  lost.  Maracaibo,  Caracas,  Valencia, 
Puerto-Cabello,  Cumana  and  Barcelona,  took  the  initiative  in 
this  movement  before  Aragua  where  General  Monagas  resided, 
and  at  the  end  of  July  1835,  the  General  was  intimately  con- 
vinced that  the  great  majority  of  the  whole  of  the  Republic 
had  the  same  feeling.  From  the  same  principle  and  against  all 
that  he  most  loved,  he  had  in  the  early  part  of  1830,  joined  in 
the  revolution  of  Venezuela  against  Colombia  and  the  Libera- 
tor ;  and  then  it  was  that  being  undeceived  and  perceiving  his 
error  he  remained  in  arms  only  three  months  and  some  days, 
the  time  which  was  indispensably  necessary  to  persuade  him- 
self that  the  great  majority  of  Venezuela  did  not  desire  to  change 
her  institutions. 

Paez  well  knows  that  had  General  Monagas  chosen  to  con- 
tinue in  arms,  it  would  not  have  been  very  easy,  and  perhaps 
impossible  to  overcome  him,  that  much  blood  would  have  been 


shed,  and  that  the  Republic  would  have  suffered  incalculable 
evils  ;  and  he  knows  also  that  it  was  a  highly  patriotic  feeling 
which  determined  General  Monagas  to  compel  his  companions, 
for  the  second  time,  to  lay  down  their  arms  without  a  combat. 

From  that  time  until  1846,  General  Monagas  continued  to 
lead  his  usual  life  of  a  laborious  and  pacific  citizen,  giving  to 
Paez  an  example  of  circumspection  and  obedience,  which  a 
man  of  his  character  and  circumstances  ought  to  observe.  In 
1846  the  Republic  was  no  longer  that  which  Paez  had  govern- 
ed so  many  years,  and  it  was  clearly  evident  that  a  new  epoch 
was  about  to  commence.  They  sought  the  man  necessary  to 
the  times,  and  this  man,  by  Paez's  own  confession,  was  Gene- 
ral Monagas,  I  remember  holding  a  conference  with  him  at 
Artiz,  in  the  month  of  October  of  that  year,  at  which  he  said 
to  me,  "  Some  people  are  thinking  of  Salom,  but  what  contin- 
gent aid  can  he  bring  with  him  to  the  Presidency  1  Monagas 
brings  his  great  party  in  the  east,  a  party  whose  concurrence  it 
is  necessary  to  obtain,  under  present  circumstances,  for  the  salva- 
tion of  the  Republic. 

Therefore  the  error  of  Paez  was  not  in  thinking  of  Monagas  ; 
because  he  who  has  so  many  reasons  for  well  knowing  Vene- 
zuela, independently  of  his  ulterior  intention,  thought  that  the 
election  of  Monagas  was  a  NECESSARY  election,  and  I  for  my 
part  declare  that  I  so  considered  it.  Had  Paez  continued  thus 
to  think  without  allowing  himself  to  be  led  away  by  the  adula- 
tion of  flatterers  and  his  own  ambition,  the  Republic  would  have 
remained  tranquil,  the  presidency  of  General  Monagas  would 
have  produced  lasting  advantages,  and  a  great  part  of  the  credit 
thus  obtained  would  have  been  apportioned  to  Paez.  The 
error  Paez  committed  was  in  believing  that  because  he  had 
been  the  instrument  by  which  the  amnesties  of  1831  and  1835 
had  been  granted  to  Monagas,  the  latter  would  have  made 
himself  subordinate  to  him  in  the  presidency.  Up  to  that  time 
he  had  not  received  from  General  Salom  even  a  friendly  look, 


66 

and  there  was  nothing  to  authorize  him  to  infer  that  the  said 
General  would  be  more  condescending  towards  him  than 
General  Monagas.  I,  who  believe  I  know  somewhat  of  the 
feelings  of  Paez,  had  formed  an  opinion  that  between  Salom  and 
Monagas,  Paez  would  decide  for  the  latter  ;  and  in  this  I  was 
not  mistaken.  Many  were  the  efforts  made  by  Quintero  to 
wean  Paez  from  this  determination ;  but  he  could  not  succeed 
in  doing  so,  and  from  no  other  reason  than  that  which  I  have 
just  explained.  And  in  fact,  in  this  Paez  did  not  deceive  him- 
self :  if  he  had  always  followed  his  own  instincts  he  would  at 
this  time  be  in  a  very  different  position.  Had  General  Salom 
succeeded  in  obtaining  the  presidency,  he  would  not,  as  General 
Monagas  did,  have  shown  him  such  a  mark  of  deference  as 
that  of  appointing  such  a  ministry  as  he  did  at  the  onset.  The 
Guzman  question  would  have  been  brought  forward,  and 
General  Salom  would  never  have  consented  to  become  the  in- 
strument of  his  own  dishonor  by  ordering  Guzman  to  be  shot, 
and  after  that  things  would  have  taken  the  same  course  as 
under  the  presidency  of  Monagas.  All  these  conjectures  are 
founded  on  the  most  solid  basis  which  under  the  circumstances 
can  be  advanced ;  and  I  can  appeal  to  the  events  which  have 
occurred,  should  any  proof  of  their  correctness  be  deemed  ne- 
cessary. 

The  charge  of  treachery  against  Monagas,  is  founded  by  Paez, 
in  the  first  place,  on  his  not  having  governed  the  country  with 
the  men  and  in  accordance  with  the  doctrines  of  the  party  who 
had  raised  him  to  the  presidency ;  and,  secondly,  on  his  being 
the  author  of  the  attack  on  the  Chamber  of  Representatives,  on 
the  24th  of  January,  1848.  Upon  this  ground,  and  in  the 
legal  sense  which  is  alone  admissible  with  regard  to  the  first 
charge,  it  cannot  be  said  that  General  Monagas  is  a  traitor  be- 
cause he  did  not  govern  with  the  men  and  according  to  the 
doctrines  of  that  party  ;  but  I  maintain  that  neither  in  the  po- 
.litical  republican  electioneering  sense  can  such  a  charge  be 


57 

brought  against  General  Monagas,  and  that  if  he  did  not  carry 
on  his  government  with  the  men  and  according  to  the  doctrines 
of  the  party  who  principally  decided  his  election,  the  fault  was 
that  of  the  party,  and  not  of  General  Monagas. 

I  have  the  conviction  that  the  conduct  of  the  liberal  party 
up  to  the  end  of  1846,  was  the  cause  that  General  Monagas, 
when  he  ascended  the  presidential  chair,  entertained  unfavor- 
able impressions  towards  that  party ;  but  notwithstanding,  well 
disposed  and  prepared  to  bring  about  a  peace  between  the 
parties,  and  thus  give  tranquillity  to  the  Republic.  He  found 
it  ripe  for  civil  war,  devoured  by  fierce  hatreds  and  furious 
passions,  in  consternation  at  the  imprisonment  and  trials  of 
hundreds  of  its  citizens,  and  afflicted  by  the  sufferings  of  all  the 
working  classes  and  the  critical  position  of  the  public  treasury  ; 
it  cannot  be  supposed  that  the  idea  could  ever  have  occurred 
to  him  of  breaking  off  with  the  party  which  had  raised  him  to 
power ;  for,  supposing  it  to  be  rational,  he  also  supposed  it  to 
be  just  and  moderate.  But  what  was  his  astonishment  when 
he  perceived  the  excited  state  of  their  minds,  the  violent  irrita- 
tion of  their  passions,  the  exaggeration  of  their  pretensions,  the 
intolerance  of  their  ideas,  the  extravagance  of  their  projects ! 
In  the  liberal  party  he  certainly  met  with  nothing  of  this  nature ;  I 
the  liberal  party  knew  its  own  position,  which  ought  to  be  that  1 
of  supplicants,  and  for  that  reason  mild,  gentle,  tolerant,  and  j 
very  limited  in  its  pretensions.  It  mattered  little  to  it  whether . 
the  oligarchical  party  continued  to  govern  the  country,  provided 
that  the  candidate  it  had  brought  forward  for  the  presidency  in 
opposition  to  General  Monagas,  should  be  saved  from  death  ; 
that  the  sufferings  of  those  who  had  compromised  themselves 
in  a  revolution,  of  which  not  the  whole  party  had  approved, 
should  be  alleviated ;  and  that  guarantees  should  be  given  to 
them  that  they  should  be  considered  (as  they  did  in  fact,)  as 
composing  four-fifths  of  the  Republic.  But  the  directors  of  the 
oligarchical  party  did  not  think  that  proceeding  in  such  a  man- 


58 

ner  would  be  in  the  least  degree  fitting.  No :  they  spoke  only 
of  the  death  of  Guzman  as  being  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
the  Republic ;  of  punishing  those  who  had  been  implicated  in 
the  revolution ;  of  diminishing  the  right  of  suffrage  ;  of  a  species 
of  militia  which  being  exclusively  subjected  to  the  command 
of  Paez,  should  render  even  the  Executive  Power  subordinate 
to  him.  The  men  were  not  to  be  taken  from  every  class,  but 
selected  from  among  those  who  were  the  most  furious  against 
the  liberals  ;  and  the  latter  were  to  be  treated  in  all  and  every- 
thing with  harshness  and  disdain,  and  as  being  capable  of  every 
evil  actipny^In  a  word,  the  directors  of  the  oligarchical  party 
strove  to  introduce  in  legislative  and  administrative  measures, 

O  ' 

a  system  of  violence,  terror  and  partiality,  making  the  first 
magistrate  of  the  State  an  instrument  of  their  passions  and  their 
revenge,  plunging  him  into  a  tortuous  career  which  could  con- 
duct him  only  to  ignominy  or  to  despotism.  This  is  a  slight 
|  sketch  of  what  presented  itself  to  the  view  of  General  Monagas 
'..during  the  first  three  months  of  his  administration. 

Such  exaggerated  and  irrational  pretensions,  caused  him  in 
the  first  instance  to  vacillate,  and  as  at  the  same  time  he  was 
becoming  duly  informed  of  the  increase  and  number  of  the 
liberal  party,  and  of  the  justice  and  moderation  of  their  de- 
mands, the  conclusion  which  such  a  man  would  come  to  who 
desired  the  welfare  of  the  Republic,  was  perfectly  natural  and 
logical,  namely :  to  render  himself  independent  of  the  oligarchical 
party,  and  act  with  justice.  Could  they  be  called  doctrines, 
those  which  that  party  wished  to  pursue  ?  Could  the  men 
who  formed  that  party  inspire  him  with  confidence  ? 

General  Monagas  did  therefore  render  himself  independent  of 
it,  in  the  first  place  by  ridding  himself  of  the  ministry  which  had 
been  formed  entirely  to  the  taste  of  Paez,  and  determined  to 
govern  thenceforth  of  himself ;  but  very  shortly  afterwards,  and 
even  before  the  commutation  of  Guzman's  sentence,  he  found 
that  those  disappointed  passions  would  be  directed  and  with  all 


their  virulence  against  him  ;  that  those  men  aspired  at  nothing 
less  than  domineering  over  the  Republic,  be  it  by  what  means 
it  might,  that  they  would  not  be  satisfied  with  half  measures, 
that  all  his  political  creed  was  to  be  reduced  to  them  and  to 
their  purposes,  and  that  all  he  might  do,  which  could  be  con- 
sidered in  accordance  with  the  sentiments  of  these  frenetics, 
would  produce  no  other  effect  than  that  of  weakening  the  faith 
and  dampening  the  enthusiasm  of  the  liberal  party  which  could 
be  opposed  to  them,  and  induce  them  to  laugh  at  and  deride  his 
blindness  and  his  condescension.  He  therefore  determined  on 
obtaining  the  support  of  the  men  and  doctrines  of  the  liberal 
party,  and  thus  has  been  explained  and  justified  the  whole  of 
the  conduct  of  General  Monagas,  in  1847.  Many,  many  are  the 
facts  which  might  be  cited  in  proof  of  what  I  have  here  stated, 
but  should  this  be  required  of  me,  I  would  appeal  only  to  the 
columns  of  "La  Prensa"  and  "  ElEspectadw,"  which  were  the 
periodicals  that  served  as  organs  to  the  oligarchists  to  color  their 
projects  and  to  unite  their  party. 

They  from  the  first  moment  spoke  only  of  the  treason  of  the 
President,  of  the  necessity  for  his  accusation  and  deposition,  of 
the  organization  of  their  party  into  a  faction  with  a  man  at  its 
head  whom  they  would  erect  into  a  principle,  and  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  doing  all  they  might  think  fit,  calculating,  as  they  did 
calculate,  on  positive  majorities  in  both  chambers.  Many  of 
the  principal  movers  who  thus  spoke  out  and  plotted,  were 
Members  of  Congress,  and  they  were  so  bitter  in  their  expres- 
sions, so  exaggerated  in  their  ideas,  so  confident  in  their  chief, 
that  it  was  impossible  not  ta  be  convinced  from  their  whole 
conduct  that  they  were  resolved  to  act  as  a  faction  which  only 
desired  to  find  a  pretext,  be  it  what  it  might,  for  Paez  to  take 
up  arms.  Could  the  President,  .could-the  nation; "view  such 
conductjiuany  other  light  than  as.  that  of  a  faction  1  And  could 
the  President  fail  to  adopt  such  measures  as  those  within  his 
power,  that  they  might  see,  should  they  continue  in  this 
course,  the  impossibility  of  carrying  their  projects  into  effect  ? 


80 

The  President  of  the  Republic  could  not,  without  disgrace  to 
his  own  reputation,  and  without  degrading  the  power  which 
the  nation  had  confided  to  him,  submit  to  the  conditions  which 
a  party  that  had  so  conducted  itself,  insisted  on  dictating  to 
him  ;  this,  indeed,  would  have  been  treason,  and  in  the  very 
fact  a  real  change  in  the  institutions,  which  from  that  moment 
would  have  ceased  to  exist,  substituting  for  them  the  will  of  a 
few  men  with  a  military  chief  at  their  head  ;  and  to  nothing  less 
did  they  aspire.  This  is  the  truth  in  all  its  purity  ;  the  nation 
saw  it,  even  the  dullest  comprehended  it,  and  now  they  come  to 
us  with  their  stupidities,  insisting  that  the  Representatives  had 
the  right  to  judge  the  President,  and  that  it  was  a  crime  to 
prevent  them  doing  whatever  they  might  please  to  do.  The 
Representatives  who  wish  to  enjoy  such  a  right,  and  to  use  it 
as  the  constitution  has  ordained  and  the  nation  desires,  the 
Representatives  who  would  not  see  such  acts  as  that  of  the 
24th  of  January,  begin  by  saying  to  themselves,  that  they  do 
not  represent  a  party,  much  less  the  passions  and  exaggerations 
of  such  a  party  ;  they  are  the  first  to  call  to  order  those  who 
have  anti-constitutional  pretences,  and  never  declare  them- 
selves the  personal  enemies  of  the  President,  nor  organize 
themselves  into  a  faction,  uniting  with  a  military  chief  to  real- 
ize his  plans.  The  members  of  this  faction  remember  no  other 
action  than  that  of  the  24th  of  January,  and  forget  all  that  pre- 
ceded it  and  co-existed  with  it.  If  the  leaders  of  the  party 
who  organized  the  plans  which  were  defeated  by  the  24th  of 
January,  had  known  what  it  is  to  govern,  to  legislate,  and  duly 
exercise  the  elevated  functions  of  representatives  of  the  peo- 
ple, they  never  would  have  consented  to  allow  the  press,  the  opin- 
ions they  themselves  uttered  and  the  policy  they  attempted  to 
inculcate,  to  have  taken  so  virulent,  insulting,  vulgar,  im- 
moderately partial  and  factious  a  direction  as  was  observed  in 
almost  all  their  actions,  writings  and  conversations  of  the  year 
1847 ;  for  they  ought  to  have  remembered  that  such  proceedings 


had  been  reviled  by  them  during  the  preceding  sixteen  years, 
and  that  they  were  irremediably  conducive  to  civil  war,  that  no 
party  capable  of  governing  upon  principle  either  could  or  ought  to 
give  such  a  direction  to  its  policy  ;  for,  as  El  Revisor  says,  It 
is  natural  that  tow  should  burn  when  fire  is  thrown  into  the  midst 
of  it.  This  fact  reveals  with  the  clearness  of  the  mid-day  sun, 
that  the  said  leaders  wished  for  war  as  the  last  resource  which 
they  could  efficaciously  employ  to  recover  their  lost  power, 
calculating  on  the  prestige  and  qualities  they  supposed 
their  chief  to  possess,  and  on  the  abuse  which  they  in- 
tended to  make  of  the  rights  conferred  on  representatives  by 
the  constitution.  The  leaders  and  many  of  the  second  order 
said  publicly,  that  what  was  most  necessary  to  them  was  some 
means  of  placing  arms  in  the  hands  of  Paez,  that  to  attain  this 
end  all  means  were  good,  and  that  the  decision  once  left  to 
the  fate  of  war  their  triumph  was  certain  and  indubitable,  for 
the  people  of  Venezuela  could  be  driven  with  whips.  They 
could  not  have  found  a  pretext  more  to  their  taste  for  declar- 
ing such  a  war,  than  the  event  of  the  24th  of  January  ;  and 
what  has  been  the  result  to  them  ?  Will  they  deny  that  the 
President  might  have  placed  fifty  thousand  men  under  arms,  if 
he  had  had  sufficient  arms,  and  had  believed  it  to  be  necessary? 
When  was  it  ever  seen  in  Venezuela,  that  thousands  of  men 
presented  themselves  to  go  forth  to  combat,  as  was  the  case 
after  the  24th  of  January  ?  And  does  not  all  this  reveal  the 
conviction  which  the  people  felt  of  the  reality  of  the  libertici- 
dal  plans  of  the  oligarchists  against  the  President  and  the  con- 
stitution ?  Why,  then,  should  they  be  astounded  at  the  event 
of  the  24th  of  January  and  all  that  followed  it  ?  Did  they  not 
ask  for  war  ? 

Clearly,  most  clearly  could  it  be  foreseen  from  the  month  of 
May,  1847,  what  must  necessarily  occur  in  1848  ;  and  the  24th 
of  January  was  nothing  more  than  one  of  a  hundred  means  of 
outbreak  which  must  ensue  between  the  parties^  and  assuredly 


62 

they  could  not  have  found  a  more  suitable  one  ;  and  yet  it  has 
been  said,  and  repeated  in  a  thousand  different  ways,  that  the 
deed  of  the  24th  of  January  was  not  that  of  the  people  of  Ca- 
racas, but  of  the  reserved  militia,  armed  and  commanded  by  the 
President,  who  had  previously  disarmed  the  active  militia.  Let 
us  examine  this. 

Much  importance  has  been  given  by  Paez  and  his  party  to 
this  fact  of  disarming  the  active  militia,  which  they  say  was 
composed  of  the  better  class  of  society,  of  men  of  the  greatest 
morality  and  education,  who  had  more  to  lose,  &c.  &c.,  but 
they  do  not  say  of  this  militia  that  there  were  not  in  the  whole 
of  the  Republic,  and  this  in  the  capitals  of  provinces  and  some 
few  cantons,  more  than  five  thousand  men,  the  major  part  in- 
JeJapable  of  serving  in  the  field  ;  that  two-thirds  of  this  militia 
(composed  the  real  and  only  oligarchist  party,  and  that  it  was 
the  most  palpable  testimony  which  could  be  given  that  society 
jsras  divided  into  a  dominant  and  a  subjected  class  ;  they  do  not 
retnember  that  some  of  the  active  militia  were  the  principal 
agents  of  the  plots  against  the  government,  of  the  provocation 
to  war,  and  they  do  not  deduce  from  this  that  to  leave  them 
armed  would  have  been  rendering  the  war  much  more  san- 
guinary and  disastrous.  This  party  who  wished  to  lead  mat- 
ters to  arbitrariment,  by  means  of  war,  ought  to  have  foreseen, 
that  the  Government  which  defended  the  institutions  against 
whoever  might  attack  them,  would  not  leave  arms  in  their 
hands  in  order  that  the  struggle  might  be  so  much  the  more 
deadly. 

The  President  therefore  disarmed  them,  but  only  in  part, 
for  many  of  them  did  not  deliver  up  their  muskets,  he  did 
this  not  to  sacrifice  them,  but  only  to  render  them  obedient ;  he 
disarmed  them  for  the  same  reason  that  you  would  deprive  a 
child  or  a  mad  person  of  a  poniard,  a  razor,  or  a  pistol ;  and  if 
the  active  militia  found  themselves  without  Government  arms 
on  the  24th  of  January,  it  was  from  their  own  fault,  it  was  for 


the  welfare  of  the  capital,  it  was  to  see  whether  the  conspira- 
tors would  desist  from  their  liberticidal  plans.  These  militia- 
men composed  but  a  minute  portion  (about  five  hundred)  of 
the  population,  and  a  government,  above  all  a  republican  one, 
relies  only  on  the  majority.  Therefore,  the  charge  brought 
against  the  President  is  of  no  weight  in  this  respect. 

By  the  militia  law  every  Venezuelan  between  the  age  of 
nineteen  and  forty-one  years  is  liable  to  be  enlisted,  and  as 
the  qualifications  required  for  an  active  militia-man  are  rare ; 
it  is  indubitable  that  the  reserve  militia  is  composed  of  what 
may  be  properly  called  the  people,  (artisans,  workmen,  agri- 
culturists,) and  it  is  known  that  in  Caracas  there  are  more 
than  five  thousand  of  the  latter  militia.  In  consequence  of  the 
Chamber  having  decreed  that  it  should  have  a  guard,  thereby 
committing  a  serious  abuse  of  its  power,  about  three  hun- 
dred men  assembled  in  the  edifice,  in  which  the  Congress 
held  its  sittings,  completely  armed,  and  no  government  in  the 
world  could  have  viewed  such  an  assemblage  otherwise  than  as 
an  armed  faction  ready  to  strike  a  blow.  Notwithstanding  this 
General  Monagas  and  the  administration  on  that  night  (23d 
January)  avoided  coming  to  a  rupture  ;  however,  they  desired, 
and  it  was  their  duty  to  desire  it,  that  the  Government  should 
appear  prepared  and  capable  of  preventing  any  attack  what- 
soever, and  it  was  with  this  motive  that  the  Governor  called 
into  service  a  small  portion  of  the  militia  of  the  capital ;  those 
from  Petare  and  other  places  in  the  immediate  vicinity  came 
in  spontaneously,  on  receiving  the  alarming  news  of  what  had 
happened  on  the  night  of  the  23d.  If  the  leaders  of  the  insur- 
gents had  not  been  so  blind  and  so  much  implicated,  they  would 
have  perfectly  understood  from  the  appearance  of  the  streets, 
and  the  expression  of  the  features  of  the  people,  that  the  gen- 
eral feeling  condemned  their  criminal  attempts ;  but  I  have 
already  said  that  all  they  were  seeking  for  was  an  open  rup- 
ture, and  far  from  being  forewarned  by  what  they  saw,  they 
only  panted  for  the  moment  of  attack.  If  such  were  the 


64 

thoughts  of  men  who  called  themselves  intelligent,  and  said 
they  had  something  to  lose,  and  were  the  elite  of  society, 
what  must  those  have  thought  who  were  insulted  by  being  ac- 
cused of  being  deficient  in  these  qualifications  !  And  then  why 
accuse  the  President  as  being  the  author  of  the  feelings  and 
actions  of  the  people  ?  The  fact  is,  that  with  the  exception  of 
the  houses  of  the  oligarchists,  there  was  not  one  in  Caracas, 
or  the  environs,  the  inhabitants  of  which  did  not  desire  the 
total  destruction  of  the  men  who  had  placed  the  community  in 
such  a  state.  In  the  park  there  were  not  muskets  enough  for 
even  a  third  part  of  the  people  who  assembled  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  church  of  San  Francisco,  all  armed  with  every 
description  of  weapons,  their  own  property ;  and  if  it  be  cer- 
tain that  the  first  attack  made  upon  the  guard  of  the  Chamber 
was  by  a  company  armed' with  muskets,  and  a  group  of  the 
people,  it  is  so  likewise  that  more  than  three  thousand  men, 
who  were  not  at  that  time  formed  into  companies,  nor  had 
they  muskets,  hastened  to  support  their  companions  ;  and  that 
the  companies  who  were  regularly  armed  were  occupied  in  re- 
straining the  general  irritation  of  the  people  and  in  saving  those 
very  conspiring  representatives ;  the  small  number  of  deaths 
which  ensued  can  only  be  explained  in  this  way.  General  Mona- 
gas  observed  the  lowering  of  the  storm,  and  he  believed  that  the 
best  mode  of  averting  it,  or  of  rendering  it  less  destructive,  was 
to  organize  the  reserved  militia  and  to  keep  it  ready  to  act  and 
in  good  subordination  ;  I  also  thought  so,  and  the  result  has 
proved  it.  But  these  men  have  pretended  that  the  militia 
should  have  fired  upon  the  people  and  that  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  President  to  have  died  defending  the  representatives  ! 
Facetious  fools  !  they  had  been  provoking  the  people  to  open 
war,  had  wished  to  shoot  the  President,  and  then  they 
attribute  the  fury  of  the  people  to  the  President,  and  they 
demand  that  the  latter  should  go  forth  and  fire  upon  the 
people,  get  himself  killed  and  endanger  all  society  to  save  them 
from  the  peril  which  they  themselves  had  sought  !  Facetious 


65 

fools  !     In  what  country  in  the  world  could  things  have  been 
combined  as  they  had  been  in  this  instance  by  the  oligarchists 
without  producing  precisely  the  same  results  ?     Has  not  the 
Revisor  told  us  that  tow  will  burn  when  fire  is  thrown  into  the 
midst  of  it  ?     Men  only  who  could  have  been  blind  enough  not 
to  see  that  they  were  provoking  one-tenth  of  the  population  to 
combat  with  the  other  nine-tenths,  and  who  could  conceive 
that  such  a  war  was  the  best  that  could  be  undertaken  for  the 
welfare  of  the  country,  only  such  men,  I  say,  could  have  doubt- 
ed that  they  were  bringing  on  themselves  the  whole  mass  of 
the  people  from  the  very  moment  that  they  commenced  their 
liberticidal  operations  ;  and  then,  to  vent  their  impotent  rage, 
they  attribute  to  the  President  that  which  they  had  themselves 
provoked,  or  it  may  be  said,  actually  organized.     The  Presi- 
dent's only  exertion  was  to  moderate  the  ardor  of  the  people, 
to  inspire  them  with  confidence  in  themselves,  and  in  the  mea- 
sures of  the  administration,  that  they  might  not  give  loose  to 
their  exasperation,  that  they  might  listen  to  him,  and  in  their 
turn  confide  in  the  President ;  there  was  no  need  for  organiz- 
ing, for  commanding,  nor  for  preparing  any  thing  against  the 
Congress.     Some   representatives   knew   that    they   were   in 
deadly  combat  with  the  entire,  compact,  and  alarmed  mass  of 
the  population,  and  they  made  a  boast  of  despising  them  ;  the 
moment  of  the  struggle  was  sure  to  arrive,  this  they  knew  also, 
and  desired  it ;  and  the  worst  step  which  the  President  could 
have  taken  would  have  been  to  have  rushed  forward  to  restrain 
by  force   or  violence  the  popular  torrent.     Unhappy  Venezu- 
ela, had  such  an  event  occurred  !     The  fact  that  a  company, 
armed  with  muskets,  was  the  first  to  come  to  blows  with  the 
Guard  of  the  Chambers,  does  not  prove  that  it  was  commanded, 
or  ip  any  way  instigated  by  the  President  so  to  do.     If  this 
company  had  not  done  it,  any  of  those  who  had  been  called 
out  to  guarantee  society  from  anarchy,  and  against  the  criminal 
attempts  of  the  faction,  would  have  effected  it.     That  company 
acted  as  any  other,  as  the  entire  mass  of  the  population,  guided 

5 


66 

by  its  own  instincts,  and  for  its  own  security,  would  have  done. 
To  such  a  pass  had  the  leaders  of  the  oligarchists  conducted  mat- 
ters. And  with  what  reason  do  they  now  come  forward  to  bring 
charges  against  the  President  ?  Let  them  bring  them  against 
themselves,  and  bear  the  penalty  of  their  madness  and  their 
blind  passions. 

To  sum  up  what  is  herein  stated,  it  has  been  proved  to  de- 
monstration to  every  man  who  is  capable  of  reflection,  that  the 
President  took  no  aggressive  part  in  the  event  of  the  24th  of 
January,  and  for  the  following  reasons  :  first,  the  facts  would  of 
themselves  indicate  that  had  the  President  taken  any  part  in 
the  attack  upon  the  Congress,  it  would  have  been  for  the  pur- 
pose of  intimidating  it,  since  he  himself  and  his  friends  saved 
the  lives  of  many  of  the  representatives,  and  even  those  of  the 
most  bloodthirsty  personal  enemies  of  the  President ;  more- 
over, this  same  effect  would  have  been  produced  by  his  merely 
allowing,  on  the  night  of  the  23d,  the  ejection  by  force  of  the 
armed  men  who  had  assembled  in  the  chambers  of  the  Congress  ; 
the  act  would  have  been  legal,  perfectly  legal,  the  Congress 
would  not  have  appeared  to  have  been  attacked,  and  it  would 
nevertheless  have  been  intimidated ;  but  as  the  President  had 
no  design  either  to  attack  or  to  intimidate,  he  that  night  re- 
strained the  ardor  of  the  people,  thus  fulfilling  what  he  consi- 
dered to  be  his  duty :  but  unfortunately  the  very  fact  of  his 
having  succeeded  on  that  night,  demonstrated  to  the  people 
that  they  would  be  compelled  to  disobey  the  President  if  they 
wished  to  prevent  the  conspirators  from  carrying  their  projects 
into  effect,  which  projects  were  not  solely  directed  against  the 
President,  but  principally  against  the  people  and  liberal  institu- 
tions ;  secondly,  it  is  a  certain  fact  that  the  idea  of  re-assemb- 
ling the  Congress  on  the  25th  was  posterior  to  the  event  of  the 
24th  ;  therefore  the  administration  had  no  plan  of  attack  against 
the  Congress,  because  it  is  not  to  be  conceived  bow  it  could 
have  organized  an  attack  to  dissolve  it,  without  having  calculat- 


67 

ed  what  would  have  to  be  done  subsequently;  thirdly,  if 
there  had  been  any  plan,  the  getting  rid  of  the  personal  enemies 
of  the  President  would  doubtless  have  formed  part  of  it,  and  yet 
they  were  precisely  these  very  persons  whom  he  and  his  friends 
saved  ;  fourthly  and  lastly,  why  impute  to  the  President  a  feel- 
ing which  these  very  oligarchists  confess  was  imbued  in  the 
souls  of  the  whole  mass  of  the  people  ?  Merely  because  many 
of  those  who  assisted  in  the  attack  had  muskets.  And  had  not 
the  House  of  Representatives  its  own  guard  amounting  to  about 
three  hundred  men,  all  armed  in  absolute  violation  of  the  law  ? 
and  did  not  this  same  guard  fire  on  the  people  and  kill  two  cit- 
izens ?  and  was  it  not  clearly  ascertained  that  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives had  been  converted  into  a  regular  magazine  of 
arms  ? 


PAEZ. 

EVERY  time  that  the  idea  of  Paez,  and  of  his  rebellion,  rises  to 
my  recollection,  my  spirit  suffers  an  inexpressible  grief ;  for  from 
the  year  1831,  I  was  the  sincere  friend  of  that  man,  notwith- 
ing  his  defects — I  long  considered  him  a  monument  of  civic 
glory  to  my  country,  and  had  hoped  that  his  name  would  have 
passed  down  to  posterity  as  that  of  the  founder  of  civil  liberty 
in  Venezuela.  Sometimes  I  had  to  suffer  for  what  I  had  ven- 
tured to  write  to  him,  telling  him  that  which  I  believed  to  be 
the  truth  under  various  circumstances  ;  but  of  this  I  never  re- 
pented, for  he,  being  animated  by  patriotic  spirit,  knew  how  to 
give  to  my  words  the  real  meaning  they  contained  ;  frank, 
though  perhaps  not  agreeable,  but  still  friendly  and  patriotic.  But 
unfortunately,  a  rnan  of  violent  character  succeeded  in  acquir- 
ing so  paramount  an  influence  over  the  mind  of  Paez,  that  he  be- 
came deaf  to  every  species  of  argument,  and  incapable  of  pro- 


68 

moting  any  other  ideas  than  those  which  were  in  perfect  accor- 
dance with  the  views  of  his  Mentor.  The  rebellion  of  Paez 
against  the  Republic  which  he  had  aided  to  create,  against  the 
institutions  he  had  aided  to  establish,  has  torn  asunder  the  tie 
which  bound  us  to  each  other ;  and  his  proclamations  and  pub- 
lications in  defence  of  his  own  conduct,  and  against  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  and  the  administration  of  which  I  formed 
a  part,  authorize  me  to  consider  him  as  the  most  terrible  pub- 
lic enemy  that  Venezuela  has  yet  had,  and  to  treat  him  with- 
out any  sort  of  consideration.  With  painful  feelings,  therefore, 
but  thereunto  constrained  by  one  of  the  most  sacred  duties 
which  a  public  man  can  have  to  fulfill,  I  am  about  to  expose,  as 
far  as  in  me  lies,  his  criminal  tendencies  :  my  country  alone 
will  be  the  gainer  in  so  painful  a  contention,  but  that  suffices. 

I  know  that  there  exist  several  historical  relations  written 
by  highly  respectable  persons,  in  which  will,  at  some  period,  be 
published  the  truth  with  regard  to  the  history  of  Paez  from  the 
year  1815  to  1821.  They  are  so  characteristic  that  they  will 
indubitably  meet  credence  with  posterity  with  regard  to  many 
atrocious  and  in  every  way  unjustifiable  acts,  of  which  he  had 
long  been  silently  accused,  but  which  within  the  few  last  years 
have  been  published  by  the  press.  I  shall  abstain  from  offer- 
ing any  opinion  upon  them.  He  well  knew  the  opinion  which 
had  been  formed  of  him,  but  believing  himself  to  be  a  man 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  country,  he  constituted  himself  that 
haughty  and  overbearing  chief,  who  did  whatever  he  thought  fit 
in  Venezuela  from  1821  to  1829.  A  thorough  soldier,  though 

O  /  O 

an  ignorant  and  spoiled  child  of  fortune,  he  was  feared  by  all 
honest  and  peaceable  citizens ;  and  anecdotes  of  his  scanda- 
lously licentious  conduct,  and  his  tyrannical  domination,  may  be 
referred  to  by  dozens.  Men  of  profligate  character  and  capa- 
ble of  every  sort  of  crime,  were  the  chosen  friends  of  Paez  ; 
while  men  of  letters,  of  education  and  of  good  morals,  if  he 
did  not  keep  at  a  distance  from  them,  he  looked  upon 
with  mistrust  and  ridicule,  when  he  did  not  compel  them  to 


69 

suffer  his  disdain  and  sometimes  harsher  treatment.  I  shall 
during  my  whole  life  remember  a  meeting  which  I  had,  with 
one  of  the  most  respectable  members  of  our  society,  in  the 
corridors  of  the  University  at  Caracas  on  the  27th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1829,  the  day  after  the  people  of  that  capital  had  sanc- 
tioned the  separation  of  Venezuela  from  the  Republic  of 
Colombia,  and  the  disacknowledgment  of  the  authority  of  the 
Liberator.  That  patriotic  man,  gifted  with  extraordinary  fore- 
sight, who  knew  that  I  was  a  partisan  of  Bolivar,  looked 
gloomily  when  he  heard  that  I  had  taken  a  part  in  the  revolu- 
tion, and  not  being  able  or  not  being  willing  to  enter  into  a  dis- 
cussion with  me  upon  the  reasons  which  I  had  alleged  to  justify 
my  conduct,  would  make  me  no  other  reply  to  all  I  said  to 
him,  and  alluding  to  Bolivar  and  Paez,  but  this,  "  Be  assured, 
my  friend,  you  are  escaping  from  Scylla  to  run  upon  Charyb- 
dis."  Such  was  the  opinion  which  was  formed  of  Paez  at 
that  time  by  all  good  men  in  Venezuela.  His  whole  conduct 
and  his  public  acts  were  the  foundations  for  this  opinion.  His 
well  known  ignorance,  even  as  to  the  simplest  ideas  necessary 
to  direct  the  conduct  of  a  public  man,  was  not  solely  what 
might  have  been  objected  to  in  him,  but  his  unwillingness  to 
subject  himself  to  all  civil  or  moral  rules,  and  his  evident  ten- 
dency to  organize  a  military  oligarchy,  so  much  the  more 
tyrannical,  because  merit  was  no  consideration  in  the  selection 
of  the  men  who  were  destined  to  oppress  the  country.  If  the 
correctness  of  this  sketch  of  his  character  be  denied  I  will 
refer  to  the  inextinguishable  records  of  his  acts  during  that 
period,  and  I  am  certain  of  confounding  any  one  who  should 
attempt  to  contradict  me.  Many  times  has  the  charge  been 
brought  against  him,  that  he  was  the  cause  of  the  destruction 
of  Colombia,  by  his  abominable  and  unjustifiable  military  revo- 
lution of  the  30th  of  April,  1826,  but  I  would  not  bring  such 
a  charge  against  him,  (because,  in  my  opinion,  Venezuela  could 
never  have  been  happy  under  that  mode  of  government,) 


70 

excepting  to  make  him  morally  responsible  for  the  tendency  to 
revolutions,  which  since  that  time  has  been  observed  among  us, 
and  from  the  example  given  by  Paez  on  that  occasion  ;  had  he 
given  that  of  obedience  to  the  government,  Venezuela  would 
probably  this  day  have  been  tranquil  and  happy,  having  in  the 
mean  time  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  better  system  of  govern- 
ment by  the  legal  means  so  clearly  pointed  out  by  the  Consti- 
tution of  Cucuta.  The  example  of  the  revolution  of  1826 
was  most  direful,  and  it  is,  perhaps,  the  real  origin  of  all  our 
evils. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  Venezuela  confided  her  destiny  to 
Paez  when  she  separated  from  Colombia  ;  but  she  was  no* 
guided  by  the  same  feeling  which  induced  the  American  Con- 
gress on  the  15th  of  June,  1775,  to  nominate  Washington  t« 
direct  the  fate  of  the  Union.  The  reasons  which  induced 
Venezuela  to  confide  in  him  were  the  same  which  had  led  the 
Liberator  to  flatter  Paez  as  he  had  flattered  him,  and  they 
are,  in  brief,  the  following :  First  :  a  revolution  which 
might  bring  about  a  war  required  a  chief,  and  the  one 
who  could  assemble  round  him  the  most  material  elements 
for  this  purpose  was  Paez.  Secondly  :  the  greater  portion  of 
the  military  then  in  Venezuela  had  been  accustomed  not  to 
acknowledge  any  other  rule  of  conduct  than  the  will  of  Paez, 
and  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  take  the  charge  of  bringing 
those  men  back  to  order  whom  he  had  himself  taught  to  live  in 
disorder.  Thirdly  :  the  question  was  to  insure  the  success  o^ 
the  revolution,  and  all  those  who  knew  the  character  and  ten- 
dencies of  Paez,  very  logically  deduced  that  if  Paez  were  not 
intrusted  with  the  direction  of  the  revolution,  the  lightest 
treachery  he  could  commit  would  be  to  deliver  up  all  the 
leaders  in  it  to  General  Bolivar,  against  whom  it  was 
directed.*  Fourthly  :  supposing  even  that  the  Liberator  would 

*  It  is  publicly  known  that  there  is  an  officer  of  high  rank  in  the  militia 
now  in  Venezuela,  who  received  from  Paez  the  commission  to  go  to  Bolivar 
and  offer  to  deliver  up  the  Republic  to  him;  and  that  when  this  officer 
arrived  in  Curac,oa  he  there  received  the  news  of  the  Liberator7*  death- 
History  will  clearly  demonstrate  this  fact. 


71 

have  allowed  Venezuela  to  remain  in  peace,  and  had  no  desire 
to  interfere  in  its  organization,  every  Venezuelan  felt  assured 
that  Paez  would  not  submit  to  any  other  chief,  nor  to  any 
authority,  and  that  if  with  him  at  their  head  they  could  not 
succeed  in  forming  a  civil  organization,  with  no  other  could  it 
be  attempted  without  exposing  us  to  a  sanguinary  civil  war, 
which  might  lead  by  its  results  to  a  military  despotism  ;  in  a 
word,  it  was  a  physical  impossibility  to  think  of  confiding  the 
revolution  of  Venezuela  to  any  other  person  without  endanger- 
ing its  ultimate  success  ;  and  as,  on  the  other  side,  the  prin-s 
cipal  leaders  in  it  felt  assured  in  their  own  minds  that  when 
the  time  should  arrive  they  could  compel  the  chief  to  act 
according  to  their  will,  they  did  not  hesitate  to  elect  him. 

And  what  had  been  feared  did  actually  take  place.  The 
constituent  assembly  being  installed,  with  one  hand  offered  its 
support  to  Paez,  that  he  might  continue  to  direct  the  fate  of 
Venezuela ;  but  with  the  other  it  was  compelled  to  keep  on 
him  a  tight  rein,  to  make  Paez  remain  in  the  path  which  Ven- 
ezuela required  that  he  should  follow.  Fortunately  there  were 
three  potent  reasons  for  his  not  becoming  unmanageable.  The 
first,  the  character  of  the  majority  of  the  Congress  and  its  in- 
fluence in  the  Republic  ;  the  second,  the  existence  of  Bolivar 
and  his  party  ;  and  the  third,  his  hope  that  he  should  continue 
in  command.  But  for  this  conjunction  of  circumstances,  it  is 
evident  to  all  who  know  the  history  of  the  constituent  assem- 
bly and  who  then  knew  Paez,  that  it  could  not  be  aflirmed 
that  he  would  have  supported  the  deliberations  of  that  body. 
If  there  was  some  patriotism  in  his  conduct  at  that  period,  it  is 
certain  that  fear  and  hope  were  the  prominent  springs  which 
operated  upon  his  mind.  Notwithstanding  this,  I  will  not  de- 
spoil him  of  the  merit  which  he  then  and  has  since  acquired, 
however  interested  may  have  been  his  motives.  But  I  feel 
authorized  to  say,  casting  a  glance  over  the  whole  of  his  con- 
duct, that  he  inwardly  resolved  as  a  condition  of  the  sacrifice 
he  made,  that  his  wUl  was  always  to  weigh  in  (he  scales  of  gov- 


72 

eminent  as  much,  as  he  might  consider  proper  to  make  it  weigh  ; 
and  this  sole  truth,  which  it  may  be  said  is  now  an  historical 
fact  sufficiently  well  proved,  the  world  will  say  annuls  and 
destroys  the  glory  or  honor  by  which  those  services  were  to  be 
repaid,  and  which  he  has  in  fact  cancelled  by  the  miseries  he 
has  heaped  upon  the.  country. 

I  will  in  this  place  repeat  what  I  said  in  my  short  answer  to 
the  MANIFESTO  OP  PAEZ,  because  I  am  resolved  on  sustaining- 
all  that  is  asserted  in  it.  That  is  to  say  :  "  that  Paez  having 
been  the  real  cause  of  the  destruction  of  Colombia,  he  did  not 
willingly  enter  into  the  path  of  civil  order  which  Venezuela  had 
traced  out  for  herself  in  1830.  He  did  not  rise  up  against  the 
constituent  assembly,  because  by  doing  so  he  would  have  been' 
a  lost  man.  Quintero  himself  knows  this,  and  he  knows  also 
what  it  cost  in  March  1831  to  oblige  him  to  go  out  to  take  the 
command  of  the  army  on  that  occasion,  because  he  pretended 
that  the  privileges  of  the  military  should  be  restored.  His  anti- 
constitutional  communications  still  exist,  and  many  men  are 
still  existing,  who  with  Quintero  proposed  to  enter  into  a  federal 
union  with  Colombia  in  order  to  restrain  Paez,  and  it  was  on 
seeing  such  measures  about  to  be  taken  that  Paez  submitted. 
It  is  also  well  known  throughout  Venezuela  what  was  the 
conduct  of  Paez  with  regard  to  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
Doctor  Jose  Vargas,  in  1835  and  1836.  We  know  that  this 
virtuous  man  has  written  historical  notes  on  the  times  of  his 
Presidency,  and  in  them  it  will  appear  that  Paez  in  a  thousand 
tortuous  ways,  showed  himself  to  be  a  disloyal  soldier  who 
sought  only  his  own  glory  at  the  cost  of  the  republic  and  of  the 
man  whom  he  had  called  his  friend.  Dr.  Vargas  was  obliged  to 
renounce  the  Presidency,  and  his  adopting  that  resolution  may 
chiefly  bo  attributed  to  the  manner  in  which  Paez  conducted 
himself  towards  him.  Even  Soublette,  during  the  two  terms 
in  which  he  exercised  the  Executive  Power,  had  to  suffer  from 
the  conduct  of  Paez,  although  he  did  nothing  without  consult- 


73 

ms:  him-     If  the  friends  of  Soublette  would  but  tell  the  truth, 

O  .  f 

they  would  say  how  muih  he  bewailed  being  President,  sub- 
jected thus  to  Paez.  These  are  truths  with  the  details  of  which 
every  one  is  not  acquainted,  but  which  history  will  reveal  with 
all  their  disgraceful  particulars ,  and  this  at  no  very  distant  date. 
In  the  meanwhile,  they  will  serve  to  strip  off  the  hypocritical 
mask  from  the  man  who  has  pretended  to  domineer  over  the 
whole  of  the  Presidents  of  Venezuela,  and  because  he  could 
not  succeed  in  doing  so  with  Monagas,  organized  a  faction  to 
overthrow  him,  implicating  in  his  crime  many  Representatives, 
and  thus  affording  the  public  scandal  of  a  chamber  of  conspira- 
tors. Paez,  therefore,  is  the  real  cause  of  the  death  of  several 
Representatives,  and  their  blood  will  cover  him  with  opprobrium 
instead  of  justifying  his  rebellion. 


APPENDIX  A. 


THE  CONGRESS  TO  THE  NATION. 

VENEZUELANS : 

THE  Congress  being  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  preserv- 
ing peace  recommended  it  to  the  people  in  its  address  of  the 
27th  of  January.  The  Congress  then  expressed  the  feeling  of 
the  national  opinion,  and  this  was  aided  and  sustained  by  its 
will. 

But  some  ambitious  men,  without  authority  and  illegally 
concealing  the  origin  and  the  truth  of  facts,  falsely  pretended 
to  be  the  supporters  of  a  Constitution  which  you  love,  that 
they  might  elevate  themselves  to  the  position  of  arbiters  of  the 
fate  of  the  Republic.  Deaf  to  every  feeling  of  patriotism, 
they  rushed  into  a  rebellion,  confiding  more  in  the  prestige  of  a 
man  than  on  the  will  of  the  people  and  the  power  of  its  insti- 
tutions. These  insensate  men,  from  whom  the  nation  had 
withdrawn  its  confidence,  preferred,  rather  than  lose  their 
power,  the  ruin  and  desolation  of  their  country. 

The  people  saved  their  laws  :  saved  their  guarantees.  One 
simultaneous  and  universal  shout  of  "  The  Constitution 
and  Liberty"  resounded  throughout  the  whole  of  the  Re- 
public, and  the  people  spontaneously  rushed  to  arms  to  sustain 
and  defend  their  Government.  The  power  of  the  national  opin- 
ion displayed  itself  in  the  most  splendid  manner.  As  soon  as 
armies  were  thus  improvised  to  put  down  the  refractory,  the 
chiefs  of  the  demoralized  faction  could  scarcely  manage  to 
unite,  and  this  by  deceit  and  force,  a  few  followers,  and  these 
quickly  abandoned  them. 

The  chief  of  this  faction,  the  centre  of  this  party,  the  first 
who  dared  to  spill  the  blood  of  Venezuelans,  received  con- 
dign punishment  in  the  field  of  "  Los  ARAOUATOS"  from  the 
hands  of  those  who  in  other  days  were  witnesses  to  or  com- 
panions of  his  glory,  when  he  defended  the  cause  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  valiant  Sons  of  Apure,  commanded  by  the  intrepid 
General  JOSE  CORNELIO  MUNOZ,  on  the  10th  of  March  defeat- 


75 

ed  the  proud  general,  who,  to  his  passion  for  command,  had 
sacrificed  his  honor  and  his  country. 

Liberty,  which  was  attempted  to  be  destroyed  in  this  age  of 
democracy  and  in  an  American  country,  triumphed  on  this 
glorious  day.  The  brave  General  Munoz  and  his  worthy  com- 
panions in  arms  have  served  their  country  with  the  feeling  of 
true  citizens  and  the  valor  of  heroes.  The  nation  owes  to 
them  a  vote  of  thanks,  and  in  its  name  the  Congress  awards  it 
to  them. 

Venezuelans  !  this  fratricidal  war  will  soon  be  terminated, 
and  Venezuela  will  once  more  testify  that  there  is  no  power 
which  can  overcome  institutions  supported  by  the  opinion  of 
the  majority  of  a  nation.  All  that  remains  to  do  is  that  you 
should  be  worthy  of  the  triumph,  sacrificing  the  injuries  you 
have  received  on  the  altar  of  public  welfare.  Love  of  our  in- 
stitutions, respect  to  the  legal  authorities,  tolerance  and  frater- 
nity, will  insure  to  us  for  ever  the  precious  gifts  of  peace  and 
liberty,  the  sure  basis  of  welfare  and  national  prosperity. 

CARACAS,  3d  April,  1848. 

(Signed,)     E.  A.  HURTADO,  President  of  the  Senate. 

F.  OLAVARRIA,    President   of  the   Chamber  of 

Representatives. 

J.  A.  FREYRE,  Secretary  of  the  Senate. 
J.  A.  PEREZ,    Secretary    of   the    Chamber    of 
.Representatives . 


APPENDIX  B. 


OFFICIAL  BULLETIN.     NO.  101. 

TERMINATION  OF  THE  WAR. 

Republic  of  Venezuela.     Heo.d  Quarters  in  Vallesito.  14th  Aug., 

1849. 
To  the  General  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  Operations 

in  this  Province: 

WHEN  I  arrived  on  the  llth  of  this  month  at  Las  Albahacas, 
I  was  informed  that  you  were  in  advance  of  me  with  troops  to 
oppose  me,  and  I  resolved  on  writing  to  you  to  induce  you  to 


76 

terminate  the  present  war  by  pacific  means  :  but  before  I  could 
close  my  communication,  I  was  attacked,  and  had  to  defend 
myself. 

I  still  entertain  the  same  feelings  which  I  did  on  the  llth  ;  feel- 
ings which  I  have  put  in  practice  all  my  life,  both  as  a  General 
in  campaign  and  as  President  of  the  Republic.  It  is  my  desire 
that  the  present  contest  should  terminate  without  augmenting 
the  misfortunes  which  the  country  deplores,  and  I  think  that 
this  great  object  can  be  attained  by  your  accepting  the  method 
which  I  have  the  honor  to  propose  to  you  through  Captain 
Jose  de  Jesus  Villasmil. 

I  send  a  duplicate  of  this  dispatch  by  another  channel,  that 
there  may  be  no  delay  in  its  arriving  at  your  head-quarters. 

I  am  your  obedient  servant, 

JOSE  ANTONIO  PAEZ. 


Republic   of    Venezuela.     Office   of  the  Commander-in-chief  of 

Operations  in  Carabobo. 

Head  Quarters  in  Macapo-abajo,  14th  Any.,  1849. 
To  the  General,  Secretary  of  State  in  the    War  and  Marine  De- 
partments : 

SIR — It  is  now  12  o'clock,  and  I  have  just  received  from 
Sefior  Jose  Antonio  Paez  a  communication  which  I  enclose, 
and  to  which  I  replied  in  the  following  terms  : 

"Head  Quarters  in  Macapo,   14th  Aug.,  1849. 
"  SEXOR  JOSE  ANTONIO  PAEZ  : 

"  At  noon  this  day  I  received  the  note  from  you  dated  this 
morning  in  Vallesito,  and  which  was  delivered  into  my  hands 
by  Senor  Jose  Jesus  de  Villasmil,  your  Commissioner,  and  I 
have  also  heard  what  the  said  gentleman  had  to  say,  and  in  an- 
swer thereto  I  have  the  honor  to  tell  you  that  I  have  no  orders 
from  the  government  to  treat ;  but  for  the  sake  of  peace  and 
to  end  the  war  that  now  desolates  our  beautiful  country,  I 
agree,  as  far  as  regards  myself,  and  lies  within  the  scope  of  my 
faculties,  to  insure  the  lives  of  all  those  who  shall  surrender 
at  discretion.  The  government  is  merciful,  and  will  always  act 
in  accordance  with  the  laws." 

All  which  I  impart  to  you  for  the  information  of  His  Excel- 
lency, the  Executive  Power. 

I  am  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)         JOSE  L.  SILVA. 


77 
I 
Republic   of   Venezuela.     Office   of  the  Commander-in-chief  of 

Operations  in  Carobobo. 
Head  Quarters  in  Monagas,  I5tk  of  August,  1849. 

SIR — I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  the  list  of  the  chiefs  who 
at  six  o'clock  this  evening  surrendered  to  the  clemency  of  the 
government.  It  has  fallen  to  my  lot  to  have  the  honor  on  this 
occasion  to  represent  the  government  forces. 

I  shall  hereafter  transmit  to  you  the  list  of  officers  and  troops 
who  have  not  yet  reached  the  camp  :  as  regards  the  artillery 
and  other  munitions  of  war,  I  will  send  you  a  note  of  them  as 
soon  as  I  can  get  it ;  at  present  I  have  not  time. 

JOSE  L.  SILVA. 


List  of  Chiefs  (Superior  Officers]  who  surrendered  to  the  clem- 
ency of  the  Government  in  the  field  of  battle  called  Monagas. 

Generals. 

JOSE  ANTONIO  PAEZ, 
LEON  FEBRES  CORDERA,  DOMINGO  HERNANDEZ. 

Colonels. 

JOSE  ESCOLASTICO  ANDRADE,     DOLORES  HERNANDEZ, 
ALEJANDRO  BLANCO,  FRANCISCO  HERNAIZ, 

CARLOS  MINCIIIN,  JOSE  CELIS, 

JOAQUIN  MARIA  CHACIN. 

First  Commandants. 

MANUEL  ANTONIO  PAEZ,  EUGENIO  MENDOZA, 

JUAN  ANTONIO  IZQUIERDO,         MANUEL  MARIA  MARTIN, 
MARIANO  USTARIZ,  PENTALEON  RODRIGUEZ. 

Second  Commandants. 

WENCESLAO  BRICEJVO,  JUAN  BETANCOURT, 

LEOPOLDO  TELLERIA,  JOSE  JUAN  EMAZABE, 

RAMON  FRANCIA. 
Vicar  General. — JOSE  AYALA. 
Surgeon  in  Chief. — DR.  VICENTE  LINARES. 
Commissary  of  War. — FERMIN  GARCIA. 
War  Auditor. — DR.  ANGEL  QUINTERO. 
A  true  copy.     Field  of  Monagas,  15th  August,  1849. 

(Signed)  SILVA. 


78 

APPENDIX  C. 

• 

ANSWER 

To  the  Message  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  from  the  Cham- 
ber of  Representatives. 

EXCELLENT  SIR  : 

The  Chamber  of  Representatives  also  offers  its  thanks  to 
Heaven  for  having  preserved  the  life  of  your  Excellency  from 
the  poniard  of  the  assassin.  It  offers  them  also  with  all  the 
effusion  of  its  gratitude,  because  it  has  deigned  to  grant  to 
Venezuela  the  most  precious  gift  its  liberal  hand  could  bestow, 
peace  and  general  tranquility. 

Treachery  being  encouraged  by  the  internal  discord  of  men's 
minds,  which  some  ill-advised  men  promoted,  led  on  to  treason 
and  disorder ;  and  the  flames  of  war  rapidly  burst  forth,  de- 
vouring the  best  hopes  of  the  country  ;  and  yet,  neither  the 
life  of  your  Excellency,  nor  the  liberty  of  our  people  could  be 
destroyed.  Providence  had  decreed  that  both  should  be  pre- 
served and  both  were  saved  ;  the  insensate  enemies  of  the 
State  thus  being  once  more  disappointed.  This  sanguinary 
civil  dissension  being  terminated,  your  Excellency,  by  display- 
ing your  magnanimity,  has  raised  the  national  glory,  making 
Venezuela  appear  as  she  is,  great  and  generous. 

Venezuela  will  perpetuate  her  felicity,  "  after  having  passed 
through  all  the  trials,  which  were  to  be  feared  amid  so  many 
contending  interests,  so  much  alarm  in  the  minds  of  men,  so 
much  anxiety  lest  the  edifice  of  her  public  guarantees  should 
be  destroyed,"  a  future  full  of  peace  and  happiness  and  concord 
awaits  her.  Vain  and  impotent  will  be  the  endeavors  of  disor- 
ganizers,  who  artfully  encouraging  injurious  rivalties,  sowing 
the  seeds  of  hatred,  and  even  of  sedition  ;  the  people  know 
full  well  that  discord  is  the  rock  on  which  the  most  liberal  and 
the  best  of  institutions  are  endangered,  and  that  union  on  the 
contrary,  stimulating  the  growth  of  patriotic  virtues,  insures 
liberty,  consolidates  peace,  gives  stable  guarantees  to  industry, 
and  opens  a  wide  field  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  of  the  com- 
munity. 

With  abundant  reason  does  the  Chamber  lament  that  a  few 
ill-advised  Venezuelans  have  undertaken  to  impute  to  our  faith- 


79 

ful  and  intrepid  soldiers  tendencies  which  are  in  opposition  with 
true  republican  principles.  This  is  doubtless  unjust,  that  in 
reward  for  their  sacrifices  and  virtues  these  men  should  be 
calumniated,  who  have  given  so  many  proofs  of  submission  to 
the  legitimate  government,  and  have  evinced  such  love  for  the 
laws,  and  to  constitutional  institutions. 

The  Chamber  of  Representatives,  animated  by  a  real  de- 
sire to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  people  by  means  of  just  and 
beneficent  laws,  relies,  from  this  moment,  on  the  firm  support 
of  your  Excellency  to  carry  out  this  work,  which  is  at  once 
one  of  earnest  will  as  of  duty,  hoping  that  there  will  hencefor- 
ward exist  between  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  that 
great  union  of  national  thought  manifested  in  the  due  ordering 
of  matters  for  the  true  interests  of  civilization,  of  liberty  and 
the  progress  of  the  people,  for  the  salutary  tendencies  of  peace, 
the  regular  and  tranquil  development  of  regenerative  ideas,  and 
in  the  alliance  of  sound  principles,  the  only  ones  that  can  lead 
society  to  fulfill  the  high  destiny  for  which  it  was  established. 


THE  following  article  is  extracted  from  a  late  Caracas  paper, 
and  as  it  is  on  a  subject  which  has  given  rise  to  much  misrepre- 
sentation we  think  it  right  to  lay  it  before  the  public  of  the 
United  States.  

A  great  deal  has  been  said  as  to  the  tendency  of  military  men 
in  Venezuela  to  establish  a  military  government.  It  is  not, 
however  just,  after  they  have  given  proofs  of  so  many  virtues 
and  of  such  submission  to  the  legitimate  Government  that  ten- 
dencies should  be  imputed  to  them  so  utterly  at  variance  with 
the  principles  they  profess. 

Is  it  requisite  to  offer  a  practical  and- incontestable  argument 
against  this  loudly-trumpeted  military  propensity,  and  which  it 
has  been  falsely  said  is  cherished  by  our  old  epaulettes  ?  Well 
then  we  will  do  so.  In  1830  the  Republic  was  declared  to  be 
in  assembly,  a  respectable  portion  of  the  army  was  under  arms, 
the  Liberator  was  shining  resplendently  in  front  of  troops  inured 
to  war  and  who  had  frequently  been  conquerors  ;  a  military 
government  was  at  that  time  necessary  to  a  certain  extent  and 
nothing  could  have  been  more  easy  than  to  have  established  it. 
And  what  was  the  result  ?  That  these  same  military  men  wish- 
ing for  a  more  permanent  state  of  things,  labored  to  obtain  a 


80 

popular  and  liberal  compact,  decreed  the  disarming  of  the  troops, 
gave  up  their  privileges,  and  with  satisfaction  returned  once 
more  to  mingle  with  the  people  whom  they  had  liberated. 
Fourteen  of  our  old  soldiers  with  their  own  hands  signed  the 
constitution  of  the  State,  and  the  remainder  subsequently  de- 
fended it  with  their  blood. 

In  1840  the  present  chief  of  the  Republic  called  the  citizens 
to  arms  ;  the  people  flew  to  seize  them,  and  twenty  thousand 
citizens  at  once  lent  their  aid  to  the  army.  Circumstances  had 
then  assumed  a  solemn  aspect  and  no  man  in  Venezuela  had 
ever  yet  attained  the  prestige  which  accompanied  General  Jose 
Tadeo  Monagas.  A  single  word  from  him  at  that  moment 
would  have  sufficed  to  establish  the  military  system  ;  and  yet, 
what  was  the  result  ?  That  this  same  President  General  un- 
ceasingly exhorted  his  troops  to  show  obedience  to  the  laws 
and  respect  to  the  constituted  authorities  ;  and  after  having 
saved  our  institutions  and  re-established  the  sovereignty  of  the 
popular  will,  the  army  was  disbanded  and  that  without  even 
paying  the  soldiers  the  arrears  that  were  due  to  them. 

Where  then  is  this  military  mania  with  which  our  faithful 
defenders  are  calumniated  when  in  every  circumstance  they 
have  given  efficacious  proof  of  their  love  of  constitutional  order 
and  of  republican  principles  ?  Where  then  exists  this  military 
spirit,  this  spirit  of  terrorism  and  oppression,  when  all  the  power 
that  exists  among  us  is  in  the  laws  and  all  our  strength  is  vested 
in  the  popular  will  ? 

But  to  conclude  ;  this  military  spirit  is  a  ridiculous  invention 
malignantly  forged  for  the  purpose  of  alienating  men's  minds 
from  each  other  and  engendering  discord  between  those  who 
should  always  be  united  and  compact ;  it  is  an  infamous  idea 
of  the  opposition  by  which  they  attempt  to  render  unpopular  the 
administration  of  the  patriotic  General  Mtmagas  ;  it  is  in  short 
a  mine  which  is  to  be  worked  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Repub- 
lic, seeking  in  another  zone  that  which  in  this  cannot  be  found. 

Our  brave  military  men  have  been  calumniated  ;  but,  we  can 
repeat  in  the  words  of  our  President  in  his  message,*  "ouch  an 
atrocious  calumny  originates  only  with  those  who  are  seeking 
to  attain  objects  beyond  their  strength  or  their  deserts,  or  with 
men  who  with  depraved  designs  attempt  to  throw  society  into 
disorder." 

*  See  answer  to  the  President's  Message,  Appendix  C. 


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